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ABSTRACT 
Geoff	Gilbert	and	Anna	Magdalena	Rüsch*	
This article considers how a rule of law approach, central to the UN’s activities since 
2004, could facilitate the operationalization of interoperability across its agencies. But 
what is rule of law: the Anglo-American judicalized understanding or the civil law 
model, l’Etat de droit or Rechtsstaat, that is more rooted in the governance of the State? 
And while a State that increasingly adopts a rule of law stance will, with the support of 
the UN, better protect and empower all persons on its territory, the UN itself must also 
uphold the rule of law. The crucible of displacement is used to put these arguments to 
the test, since this highlights the essentially Westphalian framework of international law 
and practice, as it involves more than one State and more than one UN operation. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
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The Secretary-General’s 2004 Report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict 
and post-conflict societies endorsed the centrality of rule of law to the UN.1 This was 
affirmed by the High Level Meeting of the General Assembly of 2012.2 This article 
addresses the application of the rule of law to United Nations (UN) operations, sometimes 
across borders, as well as to the UN itself, as an international organization seeking to provide 
a co-ordinated response to global crises or, in the UN’s words, ‘Delivering as One’. 
The phrase ‘rule of law’ is sometimes used by lawyers and non-lawyers without the 
degree of precision that would make it a useful measure of progress and achievement. 
Indeed, as that criticism indicates, in this article the principle should be understood as both a 
process and an end goal.3 Before one can explore its application, however, it is essential to 
																																																								
1 Report of the Secretary-General, S/2004/616 (23 August 2004) para 6: ‘The “rule of law” 
is a concept at the very heart of the Organization’s mission. It refers to a principle of 
governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the 
State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and 
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms 
and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of 
supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the 
application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal 
certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency’. Neither the 
General Assembly nor the Security Council has ever adopted this definition, although GA 
res 60/1 (24 October 2005) adopts some of the same ideas. The UN approach to rule of law 
is discussed at length below. See Robert McCorquodale, ‘Defining the International Rule of 
Law: Defying Gravity?’ (2016) 65 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 277. 
2 UNGA res 67/1 (24 September 2012) para 2. There have been a series of GA Resolutions 
since 2005 – the latest can be found at UNGA res 71/148 (13 December 2016), which calls 
for: ‘20. … strengthening [of] the rule of law through access to justice, including with regard 
to the provision of birth registration for all, appropriate registration and documentation of 
refugees, migrants, asylum seekers and stateless persons’. See Key Documents at 
<www.un.org/ruleoflaw/keydocuments>. 
3 Compare McCorquodale (n 1) 290–91, he talks of degrees of rule of law compliance, 
which fails to recognise that rule of law is a process, especially given that no State could 
ever fully attain the rule of law. See Martin Krygier on the teleological account of the rule of 
law: ‘Rule of Law (and Rechtsstaat)’ in James D Wright (ed), International Encyclopaedia 
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consider the different levels at which rule of law operates; the different understandings of 
rule of law, something that is rarely addressed; and the overlap with similar concepts, which 
can help to explain, and yet risk confusing, both its reach and its potential impact. The article 
looks, first, at conceptions of the rule of law in different legal systems and then at how it 
might be applied vis à vis international organizations, particularly the UN. The article 
examines how the rule of law might facilitate UN interoperability, that is, how the UN’s 
various agencies can utilize the principle, as it is understood within the organization, so as to 
promote an integrated response. To highlight the value of rule of law to international 
organizations operating across borders, the article uses examples drawn from the context of 
protracted displacement, involving, as it does, more than one State, more than one UN 
operation. Studies of rule of law in the UN have usually focused on how well or poorly it has 
worked in particular instances.4 This article, on the other hand, looks at its potential to 
promote durable solutions through interoperability within the UN, enhancing State capacity 
and promoting the international protection of individuals. Since, however, the principle also 
requires the UN itself to uphold the rule of law, the final section of the article looks at how 
this might be put into practice so that, where possible, this might also enhance 
interoperability. 
1.1  Why displacement? 
Mass displacement of individuals, as well as being highly pertinent and topical,5 provides a 
challenging framework for considering rule of law in the UN. As indicated, it will usually 
																																																								
of the Social and Behavioural Sciences (2nd edn, vol 20, 2015) 780, 785; and Martin 
Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (2010) ch 11: ‘Rechtsstaat, Rule of Law, l’Etat de 
droit’ 312–41. 
4 For an interesting critique of the UN’s approach to rule of law, see David Marshall (ed), 
The International Rule of Law Movement: A Crisis of Legitimacy and the Way Forward 
(2014). 
5 UNHCR, ‘Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016’ 
<http://www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34>, indicates that there were 65.6 million individuals of 
concern to UNHCR in 2016. See Secretary-General’s Report, ‘In Safety and Dignity: 
Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants’ UN doc A/70/59 (21 April 2016) 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/59&=E%20>, the outcome 
document for the high-level plenary meeting of the General Assembly held on 19 September 
2016; and GA res 71/1 (19 September 2016) (New York Declaration), Annex I 
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affect more than one sovereign State, probably more than one UN operation, and several 
different UN actors. A lack of the rule of law will be part of the cause of individuals fleeing 
and its restoration will be needed to promote return. However, those displaced will impact 
on rule of law in the host State. As no one UN agency can facilitate rule of law on its own, it 
requires interoperability. Finally, since those displaced often rely on the UN to provide 
protection, the UN’s own rule of law responsibilities will be engaged. Thus, displacement 
brings into sharp relief a range of issues regarding rule of law and the UN. 
The UN agency with primary responsibility for displaced persons is the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); it provides international protection to refugees and 
seeks permanent solutions by assisting governments.6 UNHCR has an extended mandate to 
protect refugees, returnees, and asylum seekers; to take the lead on the protection of conflict 
IDPs; and to co-lead on shelter, camp co-ordination, and camp management. According to 
Türk and Eyster, ‘UNHCR is primarily mandated to provide international protection and 
humanitarian assistance and to seek permanent solutions for persons within its competence’,7 
																																																								
(Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework) and Annex II (Towards a Global Compact 
for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration). The dearth of references to IDPs is a cause of 
concern – see UNHCR, Conclusion of the Executive Committee on international cooperation 
from a protection and solutions perspective No 112 (LXVII) (6 October 2016) Preamble 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/57f7b5f74.html>. See also Elizabeth Ferris, ‘In Search of 
Commitments: The 2016 Refugee Summits’; Volker Türk, ‘The New York Declaration: 
Once in a Lifetime Opportunity to Enhance Refugee Protection’; and Geoff Gilbert, 
‘Glimmers of Hope’ – all Kaldor publications available at 
<http://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/september-summits-refugees-background-
commentary-and-resources>; and, Volker Türk and Madeline Garlick, ‘From Burdens and 
Responsibilities to Opportunities: the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and a 
Global Compact on Refugees’ (2016) 28 International Journal of Refugee Law 656. 
6 Statute of the Office of UNHCR, UNGA res 428 (V) (14 December 1950) paras 1 and 8a; 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (28 July 1951), arts 35 
and 36; and 1967 Protocol, 606 UNTS 267 (16 December 1966), art II; and 
<http://www.refworld.org/idps.html>. Although many of the problems displaced and 
stateless persons face are so similar in practice, this article is focused on refugees, asylum 
seekers, returnees, and internally displaced persons. 
7 Volker Türk and Elizabeth Eyster, ‘Strengthening Accountability in UNHCR’ (2010) 22 
International Journal of Refugee Law 159, 162 and 163 (footnotes omitted). 
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that is, not just refugees and stateless persons but, in certain circumstances, IDPs too. The 
functions of UNHCR have expanded considerably over time. As Türk and Eyster go on to 
point out: 
Mandated activities include preventive action and participation "at the invitation of the 
Secretary-General, in those humanitarian endeavours of the United Nations for which 
his Office has particular expertise and experience". In addition, the institution of ‘good 
offices’ and the right to humanitarian initiative have been useful tools for situations 
outside mandated activities, while other functions include relief distribution, emergency 
preparedness, special humanitarian activities, broader development work, and issuance 
of documentation for persons falling under the mandate. 
Therefore, this broadened mandate of protection and humanitarian assistance, 
underpinned by international human rights law, establishes a series of obligations owed to 
displaced persons where rule of law principles could provide the framework for application. 
Further, given the average length of displacement situations tends towards 20 years, 
UNHCR’s protection mandate has to be seen as parallel to the development frameworks 
promoted by UNDP and other UN actors with the State for all those on the State’s territory – 
UNHCR protection does not mean displaced individuals are in some parallel State. A proper 
implementation of a rule of law approach demands, at State level and within the 
organization, UN interoperability. Durable and sustainable solutions for displaced persons 
depend on the realization of several rights during protracted displacements, such as the right 
to education, to property, or to the provision of documents. While such rights could be 
accorded to refugees and asylum seekers within the framework of the 1951 Convention, they 
could also be seen as a society upholding a substantive/thick rule of law, the sort promoted, 
as will be discussed, by the UN: thus, the reach of the rights would be broader as would the 
range of intended beneficiaries.8 Moreover, other UN actors that utilize a rule of law 
approach, especially those whose primary focus is development, would assist in ensuring 
that on-going solutions whilst displaced are part of a wider national plan that would aim to 
benefit both the displaced population and the host population to the same degree: the aim 
being that displaced persons would move towards achieving durable and sustainable 
																																																								
8 See eg the right to education, art 22, 1951 Convention (n 6), compared to arts 28, 29 and 32 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNGA res 44/25 (20 November 1989); or art 
13, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (16 December 1966) 
993 UNTS 3. 
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solutions. For example, in Colombia, the government, UNDP, and UNHCR formulated the 
Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI);9 with 6,000,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
as a result of the 50 year conflict, the TSI sought to facilitate resolution of the displacement 
of 17 communities through return, relocation, or local integration.10 What made the TSI 
special was that it aimed to understand the problems of internal displacement in 
substantive/thick rule of law terms so as to identify and engage with possible partners, such 
as other UN actors, the government, as well as NGOs, in order to facilitate and channel the 
work that was already being carried out. In the five initial TSI locations across the country, 
one of the first activities undertaken was the provision of legal advice on land ownership 
rights, a quintessential rule of law response to displacement. In Niger, as another example, 
the government and UNHCR established zones d’accueil des réfugiés for nomadic herders 
from Mali: after registering as refugees/asylum seekers with the Commission Nationale 
d’Eligibilité au Statut du Réfugié, the Malians were given grazing rights for their animals 
across a swathe of Nigerien territory in order to preserve their way of life and to uphold their 
right to work, obligations of States parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees.11 
These two examples indicate the way rule of law can provide frameworks for 
operationalizing a solutions-oriented approach within the UN. States upholding the rule of 
law will, with the assistance of the UN, enable access to rights for all those within their 
territory and jurisdiction. As a result, forcibly displaced persons, possibly the most 
vulnerable group in international law, lacking a State to protect them, can move towards 
achieving durable and sustainable solutions. 
2.  WHAT THE RULE OF LAW IS AND IS NOT … AND WHAT IT REALLY 
IS IN THIS CONTEXT 
																																																								
9 On TSIs generally, see UNHCR, ‘Concept Note: Transitional Solutions Initiative - UNDP 
and UNHCR in collaboration with the World Bank’ (2010) 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/517511934.html>. 
10 See UNHCR’s information page on Colombia for 2016 <http://www.unhcr.org> and the 
2016 Plan <http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2542?y=2016#year>. 
11 See, Intikane Refugee Hosting Area <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/ner> and 
associated documents. On the right to work as a self-employed person, see 1951 Convention 
(n 6) art 18. 
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While rule of law at the domestic and international levels has been investigated in depth by 
legal theorists and constitutional specialists, with respect to international organizations, 
especially the UN, there is still no single, accepted understanding of its application and 
implementation.12 It is fair to say that rule of law is a concept with many meanings, possibly 
too many,13 and there is, in addition, overlap with related concepts, such as good 
governance, due process, and global administrative law.14 How does one bring all this 
together to give some clarity and focus to rule of law for the UN in the context of 
displacement so that it can be a useful measure of progress and achievement? 
Rule of law is spoken about in relation to domestic legal systems and international 
law with a degree of osmotic fluidity, with only rare acknowledgement that ideas may not be 
transferable and transposable between these different regimes. Rule of law is always a 
product of the legal culture and community in which it is developed.15 Within a State, the 
rule of law, to the extent it applies at all, is established by the community and applied to the 
structures of centralized government in line with the community’s values and interests and 
through whatever constitutional documents that are adopted. States choose their own 
constitutional norms and the nature of political participation is self-determined. Moreover, 
each State, no matter how riven internally, is always more cohesive than the ‘international 
community’. The looser configuration of international society, which lacks any central 
government, makes it significantly less structured but, even here, the rule of law is a set of 
																																																								
12 See José E Alvarez, ‘International Organizations and the Rule of Law’ (2016) 14 New 
Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 3. See also European Commission for 
Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), ‘Report on the Rule of Law’, adopted by the 
Venice Commission at its 86th plenary session (Venice, 25–26 March 2011) 
<http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2011)003rev-e>; and 
McCorquodale (n 1) 278. 
13 See Loughlin (n 3) 312; Krygier (n 3) 780; Duncan Fairgrieve, ‘Etat de Droit and Rule of 
Law: Comparing Concepts - A Tribute to Roger Errera’ [2015] Public Law 40. 
14 See Carol Harlow, ‘Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values’ 
(2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 187. See also, Gianluigi Palombella, ‘The 
Rule of Law as an Institutional Ideal’ in Leonardo Morlino and Gianluigi Palombella (eds), 
Rule of Law and Democracy (2010) 3. 
15 Sir Arthur Watts, ‘The International Rule of Law’ (1993) 36 German Yearbook of 
International Law 15; Krygier (n 3) 784; Palombella (n 14) 33–34. 
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rules for a community of States created by those States, who are the primary actors in this 
case.16 In line with international law generally, international rule of law has to be consensual, 
it reflects what States have voluntarily adopted.17 Rule of law on the international plane as it 
applies to States and to international organizations, therefore, must require even more 
nuanced distinctions.18 With respect to international organizations, rule of law has to be 
‘soft’ in one sense, because their mandates, laid down in their founding instruments, 
constrain what they can and cannot do, and those are set out not by the international 
organization itself, but by the ‘parent’ States.19 Thus, rule of law for international 
organizations is not solely self-determined and could be described as ‘soft’ (in the same way 
that soft law still looks like law) because it lacks certain intrinsic attributes of domestic and 
even international rule of law.20 
2.1  Whose rule of law? 
																																																								
16 See Michael Zürn, André Nollkaemper and Randall Peerenboom (eds), Rule of Law 
Dynamics: In an Era of International and Transnational Governance (Cambridge University 
Press 2012). 
17 Watts (n 15). Compare Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B Stewart, ‘The 
Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15. 
See also both Machiko Kanetake and André Nollkaemper (eds), The Rule of Law at the 
National and International Levels: Contestation and Deference (2016); and Devika Hovell, 
‘Due Process in the United Nations’ (2016) 110 American Journal of International Law 1, 
who place undue emphasis on what happens in courts and tribunals in discerning rule of law 
and due process at the international level; given Hovell’s focus on due process, that is more 
understandable, but she is claiming to apply due process to the UN as an organization. 
18 See also Simon Chesterman, ‘An International Rule of Law’ (2008) 56 American Journal 
of Comparative Law 331; and Thomas Bingham, The Rule of Law (2010). 
19 Thus, the international organization is a secondary actor for this purpose. 
20 See Ekaterina Y Krivenko, ‘Revisiting the Reservations Dialogue: Negotiating Diversity 
while Preserving Universality through Human Rights Law’ in Kanetake and Nolkaemper 
(eds) (n 17) 289, 296. 
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Starting with the domestic level, it is not enough to simply try to distinguish between 
procedural and substantive understandings or the ‘thin-thick’ debate.21 Before that 
discussion, the rule of law in the Anglo-American tradition has to be compared with that in 
the civil law, Rechtsstaat and l’Etat de droit:22 both conceptions, taken together, may better 
underpin implementation in the context of an international organization, particularly the UN. 
As Loughlin makes clear,23 the Anglo-American approach has been refined through the 
courts and, in many ways, it is about judicial control of the other branches of government so 
that the law governs all actors within the State.24 As Krygier points out,25 the common law 
approach sees rule of law as separate from and as a ‘restraint on the state’ and as granting 
liberty by constraining the sovereign. The danger is that it leads to a very judicialized 
understanding, one that is slightly at odds with the UN’s framework, where courts are 
generally less in evidence at the international level, and even more so in regard to 
international organizations; the International Court of Justice lacks general compulsory 
jurisdiction and international organizations can only seek Advisory Opinions.26 Leading 
common law theorists on the jurisprudence of rule of law, Raz,27 Fuller28 and Dworkin,29 in 
																																																								
21 See Krygier (n 3) 783–84. The debate was developed further by Paul P Craig, ‘Formal and 
Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’ [1997] Public Law 
466. 
22 Although there are differences, l’Etat de droit draws heavily on the German understanding 
developed in the late 19th century - see Raymond Carré de Malberg, Contribution à la 
Théorie générale de l’Etat (Sirey 1920, reprinted Dalloz 2004) vol 1, s 164, esp 488 fn 5, 
and 492–93; see also Francis Hamon and Michel Troper, Droit Constitutionnel 2016–17 
(37th edn, LGDJ) ss 34 and 68. 
23 See Loughlin (n 3) 315–17. 
24 See Albert V Dicey and Emlyn CS Wade, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution (10th edn, 1959). 
25 See Krygier (n 3) 781–83. 
26 UN Charter, ch XIV, esp art 96.  
27 Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue in Joseph Raz (ed), The Authority of Law: 
Essays on Law and Morality (2nd edn, 1979) 210ff. 
28 Lon Fuller, In the Morality of Law (rev edn, 1969) 197ff. 
29 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (1985) 11–12, and Law’s Empire (1986) at 206ff. 
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the manner of a self-fulfilling prophecy, all utilize the common law context to explain and 
test their analysis. 
Traditional Rechtsstaat, on the other hand, only exists where the State itself was the 
source of law. The idea that it might be separate from the State was inconceivable. 
The Rechtsstaat means that law is the structure of the State, not an external limitation to 
it. Its voice is rationality and strict legality of administrative action, the supremacy of 
which over ordinary citizens was granted despite the recognition of rights and the 
autonomy of individuals. Liberty is a consequence not truly a premise of the law.30 
After Nazi-ism, which proclaimed that it governed through laws, post-1945 Rechtsstaat 
embedded constitutional guarantees to protect the individual from an authoritarian 
State/sovereign.31 Having regard to modern Rechtsstaat and l’Etat de droit, one can conceive 
a broader remit that is more suited to implementing rule of law at the international level, 
particularly as regards the UN and both its external and internalized adoption of the 
principle. The German principle of Rechtsstaat focuses more on the regulation of the State 
through a constitutional order ‘as a machine that would go of itself’.32 While the judiciary 
play a role, the idea of modern Rechtsstaat is one where the relevant principles, discussed 
below, direct the State or, in this case, an international organization, so as to create a 
constitutional structure that fosters support from those affected by its exercise of power – 
this represents a better framework for the rule of law in the context of the UN’s humanitarian 
operations.33 
																																																								
30 Palombella (n 14) 11, see also 10–12, 14–17. 
31 See Krygier (n 3) 783, on Germany’s 1949 Grundgesetz: ‘Art 1, Human dignity shall be 
inviolable. To respect it and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority’. See also, 
Palombella (n 14) 25–26, 31. 
32 See Loughlin (n 3) 336, citing Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The 
Constitution in American Culture (1987). 
33 See Loughlin (n 3) 336–41; and Carré de Malberg (n 22) 492: ‘Le régime de l’Etat de 
droit est un système de limitation, non seulement des autorités administratives, mais aussi du 
Corps legislatif’. Loughlin, (n 3) 319, suggests that Rechtsstaat could promote the 
individual’s complete development; and see Harlow (n 14) 192, on how French 
administrative law better encapsulates rule of law at the international level for the UN. 
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Alvarez34 is equally helpful in this regard, recognizing that rule of law at the national 
level is not directly applicable to rule of law on the international plane, and that an even 
clearer distinction within that plane between States and international organizations is 
required. With respect to international organizations, Bingham’s Elements of the Rule of 
Law (4), (5), and (6), cited by Alvarez,35 would seem most appropriate as regards its 
application to humanitarian operations:	
(4) the good faith exercise of power in accordance with purpose for which powers were 
conferred, without exceeding the limits of such powers; 
(5) protection of fundamental human rights (including nullum crimen sine lege, the right to 
fair trial, and to liberty, security, and property); and 
(6) access to other means to resolve civil disputes without prohibitive cost or delay. 
These elements, while drawn from the common law conceptualisation, are not judge-centric 
and look to the organization to establish a rule of law process for its operations that will lead 
to a rule of law end-state.36 In sum, both the common law rule of law tradition and modern 
Rechtsstaat are core to rule of law in the UN. All references to ‘rule of law’ below should be 
understood to comprise both these meanings unless otherwise stated. 
2.2  Content and context 
This combined conception of rule of law better fits the approach to the principle for the UN, 
but its content still needs to be considered as well as the context of several similar 
frameworks often used in relation to the organization: good governance, due process, and 
global administrative law. There is a clear overlap between these ideas and also a lack of 
																																																								
34 See Alvarez (n 12). 
35 ibid 9, citing Bingham (n 18). 
36 While Alvarez (n 12) says that he is trying to move from just conforming to a domestic 
rule of law mapping exercise to the international sphere for international organizations (at 
15, 25, 29–30), there is still a strong sense of rule of law founded on judicial and legislative 
propriety (31ff), rather than seeing it as a comprehensive mechanism for achieving a society 
that fulfils rule of law standards, one which includes legislative and quasi-judicial elements, 
but which is broader. See Krygier (n 3) 785–86. On the dangers of juridification generally, 
see Harlow (n 14) 211ff. See also part 4 below. 
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precision in their meaning. The resulting merging of ideas does not facilitate clarity of 
analysis and application. 
Starting with rule of law itself, as has been seen in the discussion of the common and 
civil law understandings, at its most formal and limited, it reflects the position that the State 
is governed by laws rather than by whim or diktat – a procedural/thin conception.37 It simply 
requires a procedure by which laws are made and a system of courts to implement them. 
However, does it entail the idea that laws should protect the individual from the State38 and, 
further, does it also include the broader conceptions of civil, political, economic, social, and 
cultural rights and development?39 For the purposes of this article, this constitutes the 
essence of the so-called procedural-substantive and ‘thin-thick’ debate(s).40 As will be seen, 
rule of law within the UN has to be understood as thick, simply because the thin 
																																																								
37 On the full meaning of Rechtsstaatsprinzip/Rechtsstaatlichkeit within post-1945 German 
jurisprudence, see Loughlin (n 3) fn 5, citing Katharina Sobota, Das Prinzip Rechtsstaat 
(1997) 471–526, who identifies 142 different characteristics. 
38 See the UK’s then House of Lords in Jackson and others (Appellants) v Her Majesty’s 
Attorney General (Respondent) [2005] UKHL 56: ‘159. The courts will treat with particular 
suspicion (and might even reject) any attempt to subvert the rule of law by removing 
governmental action affecting the rights of the individual from all judicial scrutiny’. 
39 See eg Colombian Constitution of 1991, art 1, which refers to estado social de derecho, a 
phrase that has allowed the Constitutional Court to promote a progressive understanding of, 
inter alia, the rights of IDPs in Colombia with which UNHCR has actively engaged. See 
Decision T-025 (Republic of Colombia Constitutional Court, Third Review Chamber, 
Bogotá DC, 22 January 2004). 
40 Proceduralists, such as Raz (n 27 210 and Dicey and Wade (n 24, require that laws are 
created in certain ways, that they meet certain formalities. Those who support more 
substantive interpretations of the rule of law require that laws meet a certain quality 
threshold, see the discussion of this position by Dworkin (n 29, where his communities of 
principle necessarily assume that law requires more than a mere rulebook test. Fuller, (n 28 
197ff, attempts to inculcate moral standards into a proceduralist approach through his eight 
principles of legality. NB. the procedural element has to form part of the substantive concept 
if the laws as a whole are to conform to a rule of law society, compare Loughlin (n 3) 333–
35; and Harlow (n 14) 192. On this understanding, the procedural element is a necessary but 
insufficient step in the process. 
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understanding makes little or no sense with respect to the function and capacities of the 
organization. 
Hovell has analysed due process within the UN41 and her understanding embraces 
similar values to substantive/thick rule of law as explained in this article.42 In addition, the 
UN itself often refers to rule of law and good governance as though they are an inseparable 
pair, especially the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.43 The danger is that 
rule of law is seen as merely a subset of good governance, an even more ephemeral, 
imprecise, and indeterminate concept. Nevertheless, if the good governance arguments 
emphasize that rule of law is more than just the judicial regulation of States and the UN, and 
that the principle should be at the heart of how operations should be run, then the juncture 
can promote a fuller understanding. Global administrative law also draws on rule of law. 
Indeed, administrative law generally is the locus for applying rule of law principles to 
administrative and governmental actors, so it should be no surprise that there is this interplay 
with respect to UN operations and UN interoperability.44 
As Harlow showed, while distinctions may be drawn between global administrative 
law, good governance, due process, and rule of law, they all interact and cannot be neatly 
separated out. On the other hand, this article focuses on rule of law because the UN has 
adopted that particular principle as a framework for its activities.45 The problem with a lot of 
the academic discussion of rule of law for the UN or, for that matter, good governance, due 
																																																								
41 Hovell (n 17). On the overlap between rule of law and due process, see Harlow (n 14) 
204–07. 
42 See Hovell (n 17) 3, 17. 
43 See eg World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law’ 83: ‘It 
has long been established that the rule of law - which at its core requires that government 
officials and citizens be bound by and act consistently with the law - is the very basis of the 
good governance needed to realize full social and economic potential’. See also 
<https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/governance/good-governance/>. It is worth 
noting that rule of law is often seen as the ‘junior partner’ in this relationship. 
44 See Harlow (n 14) 191. As such, the interplay of both these ideas is to the fore in part 4, 
below, on rule of law as applying to international organizations. 
45 See 2004 Report (n 1); and 2012 High Level Meeting (n 2). 
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process, and global administrative law, is that it is often inward-looking,46 about rule of law 
for its own sake, whereas this article explores the qualities and characteristics of rule of law 
for international organizations and how it might enhance operationalization, including 
interoperability. Discussion of rule of law should be about process and result, about what it 
might achieve, not simply about its use as a measuring tool for compliance and 
accountability. 
3.  RULE OF LAW AT THE UN 
As mentioned,47 the Secretary-General’s 2004 Report on the rule of law and transitional 
justice in conflict and post-conflict societies established how the organization was to 
understand the principle.48 In 2008, there was a subsequent report of the Secretary-General 
on the rule of law at the national and international levels.49 It provided an inventory of the 
UN activities in the subject area at that time and it ran to 143 pages. The range was 
spectacular and was indicative of how the 2004 description was interpreted in different parts 
																																																								
46 Compare Harlow (n 14), whose article challenges the very idea of unthinkingly applying 
global administrative law in the international sphere. 
47 See 2004 Report (n 1). 
48 Compare World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, June 1993) UN doc 
A/CONF.157/23 (12 July 1993) paras 66 and 67, where what would be OHCHR was given 
the technical assistance mandate for rule of law: ‘67. Special emphasis should be given to 
measures to assist in the strengthening and building of institutions relating to human rights, 
strengthening of a pluralistic civil society and the protection of groups which have been 
rendered vulnerable. In this context, assistance provided upon the request of Governments 
for the conduct of free and fair elections, including assistance in the human rights aspects of 
elections and public information about elections, is of particular importance. Equally 
important is the assistance to be given to the strengthening of the rule of law, the promotion 
of freedom of expression and the administration of justice, and to the real and effective 
participation of the people in the decision-making processes’ (emphasis added). 
While this pre-dates the 2004 Report, it did not lead to any organizational adoption of rule of 
law akin to the Vienna Declaration with respect to human rights. See also McCorquodale (n 
1) 284–88. 
49 See (n 2). 
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of the organization, but the report did not cover whether the activities were successful.50 
Following a multi-actor meeting in 2011,51 the High Level Meeting of the General Assembly 
adopted its 2012 Declaration on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels.52 
Member States affirmed that ‘all persons, institutions [including the UN] and entities, public 
and private, including the State itself, are accountable to just, fair and equitable laws and are 
entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law’, a very substantive 
conception. The 2015 Sustainable Development Goals53 (SDGs) ultimately did not expressly 
include rule of law, but the targets for Goal 16 refer to rule of law at national and 
international levels. The New York Declaration on addressing large movements of refugees 
and migrants refers to rule of law as a necessary response of governments.54 Thus, rule of 
law has been embedded in the way the organization approaches its activities, both internally 
and with States; that said, different parts of the organization, depending on their specific 
mandates, can implement rule of law principles in their own particular way, something that 
allows for flexibility but that might not ensure predictability across the organization or 
facilitate inter-agency dialogue. 
The thesis of this article is that only a substantive/thick, rights-based approach to rule 
of law can properly reflect the community and culture of the UN, one that promotes the 
operationalization of interoperability within the organization. 
																																																								
50 See David Marshall, ‘Reboot Required: The United Nations Engagement in Rule of Law 
Reform in Postconflict and Fragile States’ in Marshall (ed) (n 4) 85ff. 
51 ‘Supporting Complementarity at the National Level: An Integrated Approach to the Rule 
of Law’ (7–9 December 2011). See also Secretary-General’s Report, ‘Delivering Justice: 
Programme of Action to Strengthen the Rule of Law at the National and International 
Levels’ UN doc A/66/749 (16 March 2012). 
52 See (n 2). 
53 The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), ‘Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development’ GA res 70/1 (25 September 2015): ‘Goal 16 of the Sustainable 
Development Goals is dedicated to the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for 
sustainable development, the provision of access to justice for all, and building effective, 
accountable institutions at all levels’ ... ‘16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and 
international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all’. Also see World Bank (n 43. 
54 See New York Declaration (n 5) paras 12, 43, 64 and Annex 1, para 13(d). 
	 16	
3.1  The Understanding, scope and operationalization of the rule of law in the UN 
Since the Secretary-General’s 2004 Report, the UN has utilized the concept of rule of law. 
However, there has been little conceptual thinking regarding the content and implementation 
required for it to enhance State capacity, protect and empower individuals and groups, and 
ensure effective operationalization by and within the organization.55 This section of the 
article examines the scope of rule of law in the UN, before going on to explore how the 
organization has adopted rule of law in practice, often in relation to the challenging 
environment of displacement to highlight its relevance to all UN operations, its applicability, 
and also its complexities. 
This requires an appreciation of what interoperability means in the UN.56 At one 
level, it is about sharing resources on the ground.57 Under ‘Delivering as One’,58 the UN as a 
whole aimed to provide a coherent and co-ordinated response to crises, so interoperability 
was central to this plan. Under rule of law, the broader idea of co-operating with States and 
enhancing their capacity is core, as well as UN actors working together – central to the 2012 
Declaration.59 For UNHCR, with its unique protection mandate, interoperability in the 
context of displacement focuses on co-ordinating activities within the UN for the benefit of 
																																																								
55 Compare Alvarez (n 12). See also ‘UNHCR Recommendations for Greece in 2017’ 
<http://www.unhcr.org/58d8e8e64.pdf>. 
56 The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as: ‘The ability of two or more pieces of 
equipment esp. military equipment, to operate in conjunction’ (first used 1965), 
‘interoperability, n.’ OED Online (June 2017), Oxford University Press <http://0-
www.oed.com.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/view/Entry/248420?redirectedFrom=interoperability&> 
accessed 29 October 2017. 
57 However, given the entirely non-political and humanitarian character of UNHCR’s work 
under para 2, Statute (n 6), should it ever lend vehicles to DPA or DPKO? 
58 See ‘Independent evaluation of lessons learned from “Delivering as one”’, UNGA res 
66/859 (26 June 2012) <http://www.un.org/en/ga/deliveringasone/>. DaO is not as 
prominent in the UN as it was in 2013–16, its thrust having been subsumed in the Secretary-
General’s reform initiative. 
59 See (n 2). 
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individuals of concern, although, on the ground, it works with external humanitarian 
agencies as well. 
3.2  The concept of rule of law in the UN and its scope of application 
The UN has adopted its own practice and policy with respect to rule of law. While 
international and domestic interpretations interact with how the UN utilizes the rule of law 
principle, it has adopted a discrete understanding that could potentially underpin effective 
operationalization of interoperability. The UN is not one monolithic structure marching to 
the beat of a single drum and its adoption of rule of law might facilitate an approach that 
allows it to ‘deliver as one’ to enhance State capacity and to empower individuals and 
groups of concern.60 It might also enhance ‘legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and 
procedural and legal transparency’ within the organization.61 
For all this to be achieved, the concept of rule of law for the UN needs to be 
established and the scope of activities to which the organization must adopt a rule of law 
approach then needs to be set out. 
3.2.1  Understanding how rule of law might be conceived for the UN:  rule of law and 
Rechtsstaat 
As indicated above, rule of law has been much explored by legal theorists, constitutional 
lawyers, and, more recently, international lawyers, including how it might be understood 
within the UN.62 Given the 2004 Report and its express reference to the UN’s concept of the 
																																																								
60 Quaere, McCorquodale (n 1) 278, who sees rule of law as refuting the idea that 
international law is simply ‘politics or lacking normative legality’. His article produces a list 
of factors appropriate to the international legal environment, but the starting point for his 
analysis, the High Level Meeting of 2012, was never just about what international rule of 
law is; but also about how rule of law can be used to achieve a goal, a rule of law society, 
through a process of rule of law implementations. As such, his new definition is of little use 
to the UN on the ground, working with States, individuals, and a co-ordinated organization 
providing coherent programmes. 
61 Compare Andrea Bianchi, ‘Ad-hocism and the Rule of Law’ (2002) 13 European Journal 
of International Law 263. 
62 For a view of the possible content of rule of law within the UN, see Alvarez (n 12). See 
also Watts (n 15); Chesterman (n 18); Kenneth J Keith, ‘The International Rule of Law’ 
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rule of law as being a principle under which laws are ‘consistent with international human 
rights norms and standards’, one might assume it must be understood to embrace the 
‘thick’/substantive interpretation, one that is invested with the attributes of Preamble to the 
Charter and its purposes and principles.63 That, though, would be simply to restate the 2004 
Report in other terms. For the purposes of this article, it is necessary to briefly consider how 
rule of law theory would accommodate the UN, but equally how rule of law in the domestic 
and international spheres cannot readily be transposed onto the organization: one might need 
to adopt a ‘soft’ interpretation and application of rule of law for the UN. 
The appropriate theoretical framework for rule of law as regards the UN depends on 
how one applies rule of law principles to different entities. In the case of the UN, its rule of 
law must reflect Charter values; moreover, the institution’s subsequent elaboration of a rule 
of law framework is one that is developed through and overseen by the General Assembly of 
the Member States.64 Equally, since the foundational documents lay down the institution’s 
powers, references back to the Charter and to human rights more generally in UN rule of law 
																																																								
(2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International Law 403; PS Rao, ‘The Nature and Function of 
International Law: an Evolving Rule of International Law’ (2015) 55 Indian Journal of 
International Law 459; Machiko Kanetake, ‘The Interfaces between the National and 
International Rule of Law: a Framework Paper’ in Kanetake and Nollkaemper (eds) (n 17) 
11; and Hovell (n 17). 
63 Charter of the UN (26 June 1945): ‘We the Peoples of the United Nations determined … to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in 
the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, …. Article 1. The 
Purposes of the United Nations are: ... 3. To achieve international cooperation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; …’. James Goldston, ‘New Rules 
for the Rule of Law’ in Marshall (ed) (n 4) 19, points out that the September 2000 draft 
Millennium Development Goals for all States also connected rule of law with international 
human rights, but the final 2001 version of the MDGs removed all references to rule of law 
and human rights. The SDGs (n 53 include a reference in the targets for Goal 16. 
64 See 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA res 60/1 (24 October 2005) para 119. 
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are not, in this case, indicative of a circular argument, but recognize the context of rule of 
law for an international organization – its community and culture.65 
While a procedural understanding of rule of law might be adequate for certain 
international organizations, not even Fuller’s principles of legality66 could properly 
encompass rule of law for the UN, given that the Charter and subsequent developments 
within the organization as to the remit of human rights guarantees reference rule of law.67 As 
the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 sets out, the human rights 
in the Declaration ‘should be protected by the rule of law’.68 Whether one terms it 
																																																								
65 See subsequent discussion of the accountability of the UN as part of rule of law, part 4; 
see Case C-402/05, P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the EU 
and Commission of the EC [2008] ECR I-06351; and Al-Dulimi and Montana Management 
Inc v Switzerland App No 5809/08 (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 21 June 2016) paras 145–49, 
where the Grand Chamber held that the Security Council decisions that affect individuals 
must be subject to a review based on human rights standards: ‘As a result, in view of the 
seriousness of the consequences for the Convention rights of those persons, where a 
resolution such as that in the present case, namely [Security Council] Resolution 1483, does 
not contain any clear or explicit wording excluding the possibility of judicial supervision of 
the measures taken for its implementation, it must always be understood as authorising the 
courts of the respondent State to exercise sufficient scrutiny so that any arbitrariness can be 
avoided. By limiting that scrutiny to arbitrariness, the Court takes account of the nature and 
purpose of the measures provided for by the Resolution in question, in order to strike a fair 
balance between the necessity of ensuring respect for human rights and the imperatives of 
the protection of international peace and security’. European Court of Human Rights 
decisions available online at 
<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"documentcollectionid2":["JUDGMENTS","DECISIONS",
"ADVISORYOPINIONS"]}>. 
66 See (n 28 esp 197–204. The use of internal morality by Fuller to support a proceduralist 
stance on rule of law is akin to eating one’s cake while denying it was cake. Also see 
Loughlin (n 3) 333–35. 
67 See esp World Conference on Human Rights, Preamble (n 48. 
68 GA res 217A (III) (10 December 1948) (UDHR 1948). 
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substantive, thick, or the middle way,69 rule of law within the UN is more than simply 
establishing procedures by which to create law. However, while rule of law for the UN must 
incorporate human rights values in terms of its own actions, in the way it builds capacity 
within States and enhances the protection of individuals, it is essential to avoid equating rule 
of law with international human rights law as that would negate rule of law as a separate 
framework and process. Rule of law and international human rights law are mutually 
reinforcing.70 When one has regard to the full scope of civil, political, economic, social, and 
cultural rights, which address a range of issues richer than a thick interpretation of rule of 
law, those rights set out the aspirations of a comprehensively enabling society where rule of 
law is intrinsic and embedded. Yet, rule of law/Rechtsstaat encompasses ideas about the 
governance, structures, procedures, and processes of States and international organizations, 
which go beyond the remit of international human rights law. It is why the Preamble to the 
UDHR 1948 talks of rule of law protecting human rights – in this context, the later 20th 
century ‘Rechtsstaat’ better expresses the understanding than the common law ‘rule of 
law’.71 UN rule of law facilitates access to human rights – it is rights-based and rights 
enhancing. 
An application of the rule of law that is limited to policing, justice, and corrections 
can still adopt a human rights infused approach, just one based on a limited set of human 
rights. Indeed, as Marshall makes clear, a lot of UN operations have seen rule of law in these 
																																																								
69 See Craig (n 21). 
70 Compare Krivenko (n 20) 293–96, who seems, in part, to treat this as troubling when, in 
fact, both rule of law and international human rights law are interdependent with discrete 
constraints on the State at the domestic and international levels. See also Craig (n 21) 487. 
71See UDHR 1948. Also see Sobota (n 37, who explains that the principle of Rechtsstaat 
incorporates eg Effektiver Rechtsschutz (effective rights protection), Willkürverbot 
(prohibition of arbitrariness), Kommunale Selbstverwaltung (local self-government), 
Verantwortlichkeit (accountability), and Verhältnismäßigkeit (proportionality). Compare 
Palombella (n 14), who contrasts common law rule of law with 19th century Rechtsstaat. 
Here, we use Rechtsstaat as it has developed since 1945, which draws on common law ideas 
of it restraining the State. 
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terms.72 However, that does not mean it is the correct approach or that it should ever be so 
conceived. To be sure, policing, justice, and corrections are part of rule of law, but they are 
not the full story.73 As Alston74 makes clear, it is important that the UN’s use of rule of law 
language is always rooted in international human rights law:75  
The answer is that rights language provides a context and a framework, invokes states’ 
legal obligations, underscores that certain values are non-negotiable, brings a degree of 
normative certainty, and makes use of the agreed interpretations of rights that have 
emerged from decades of reflection, discussion and adjudication. Most important, rights 
language recognizes the dignity and agency of all individuals and is intentionally 
empowering. 
Thus, the adoption of a rule of law approach by the UN must not become a way for States to 
attenuate their obligations under international human rights law by relying on the inherent 
																																																								
72 Marshall (ed) (n 4). See also UNDP Human Development Report 1992, 31, Box 2.2, on an 
indicative checklist of political freedom including rule of law 
<http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/221/hdr_1992_en_complete_nostats.pdf>.  
73 See Nigel D White, The Law of International Organisations (2nd edn, 2005) 23–25. 
74 See Philip Alston, ‘The Two Words that Scare the World Bank’ Washington Post (7 
November 2014) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/philip-alston-the-world-bank-
treats-human-rights-as-unmentionable/2014/11/07/9091dafa-65da-11e4-9fdc-
d43b053ecb4d_story.html?utm_term=.fdb80825d395>, on the World Bank’s reluctance to 
use human rights language while nevertheless calling ‘for gender equity and access for the 
poor to food, shelter, clean water, sanitation, health care, education and jobs’. Rule of law 
language equally risks masking the true nature of the State’s obligation ie that displaced 
persons, like everyone else within the territory and jurisdiction of the State, have rights. 
Alston is currently the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights. 
75 See also the Sixth Committee, ‘The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels’ 
UN doc A/C.6/69/L.20 (11 November 2014) Preamble, para 3: ‘Reaffirming that human 
rights, the rule of law and democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and that they 
belong to the universal and indivisible core values and principles of the United Nations’. 
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vagueness of the principle.76 As explained by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of 
truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence:77 
the United Nations system, throughout all its organs, has clearly opted for a rich 
understanding of the notion [of the rule of law] that refers to human rights, including a 
wide catalogue of political rights and, among them, democratic rights, the promotion of 
development and good governance. 
In November 2013, the Secretary-General launched the Human Rights Up Front initiative 
that aims to institute a cultural change within the UN so that the rights and protection of 
																																																								
76 See Goldston (n 63 5, on how the UN might have endorsed such an approach by States. 
On ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ values for the rule of law, see Bingham (n 18) 66–67, and Chesterman 
(n 18); along with Craig (n 21). See also Randall Peerenboom, ‘Human Rights and Rule of 
Law: What’s the Relationship?’ Research Paper 05–31 (University of California, Los 
Angeles School of Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series), which cites 
how Singapore uses rule of law discourse to justify limits on freedom of religion under the 
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (ch 167A), while its critics call for a more robust 
rule of law to challenge the government’s limitations. 
77 See Report of the Special Rapporteur to the General Assembly, UN doc A/67/368 (13 
September 2012) para 12. He goes on to refer to the Human Rights Council emphasising ‘the 
relevance of rule of law to peace, development and social cohesion (premised on gender 
equality and the elimination of all forms of discrimination)’, para 13. If the objective is to 
engage with rule of law in order to promote solutions to protracted crises, those factors are 
central to sustainability. See also his recommendation, para 82: ‘The Special Rapporteur 
wishes to highlight that country experiences of these measures suggest that a purely 
formalist[/proceduralist/thin] understanding of the rule of law has been insufficient to 
prevent violations and that the notion of the rule of law to which transitional justice bodies 
have sought to contribute is a robust one that links it with human rights, governance and 
development and that asserts its relevance for peace and social cohesion, including gender 
equality and the absence of discrimination on any grounds’ (emphasis added). The report 
also makes clear that rule of law in its substantive/thick conception goes towards 
maintaining international peace and security. See also, Palombella (n 14) 29–30. 
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civilians are a core responsibility across the organization.78 It therefore seems likely that this 
initiative must also apply to the UN’s approach to rule of law. For instance, were the UN to 
adopt a strictly proceduralist approach to rule of law for post-conflict States where it 
operates, it would be satisfied if the State applied laws in its dealings with individuals and 
institutions in the State, regardless of whether those laws met international human rights 
norms. With a proceduralist stance, the State might have to meet those aspects of 
international human rights that are peremptory norms, but even this would not satisfy the 
UN’s requirement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction, promoted since 1945.79 
If the substantive/thick approach cannot be denied, its scope still needs to be 
established to show that rule of law goes beyond those rights that encompass access to 
justice and procedural fairness to include economic, social, and cultural rights, and 
development. For that to be the case for the UN, rule of law must embrace: (a) the individual 
at the centre of planning and implementation, (b) the indivisibility of all human rights, and 
(c) a focus on outcomes rather than institutions. If this can be shown to apply in the 
complicated context of displacement, that suggests its relevance to all UN operations. 
																																																								
78 See Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, ‘Renewing our commitment to the peoples and 
purposes of the United Nations’ (22 November 2013) 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=2068#.VZ010
HhUi5c>; see also UN Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson, ‘Deputy Secretary-General’s 
Remarks at Briefing of the General Assembly on Rights Up Front’ (17 December 2013) 
<https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/dsg/statement/2013-12-17/deputy-secretary-generals-
remarks-briefing-general-assembly-rights>. 
79 If practice can be used to indicate policy, then the UN operations in Cambodia and East 
Timor (now Timor Leste) led to the ratification of a far broader range of human rights 
obligations by those States than is normal in the region. 
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3.2.2  The operationalization of a human rights content to UN rule of law 
(a)  Individual focus 
According to Waldron,80 rule of law in international law is primarily focused on the 
individual. Given that the UN understanding of rule of law embraces human rights, it must 
incorporate all individuals within the jurisdiction and territory of the State, regardless of 
nationality or even lack thereof. Clearly, IDPs as nationals of the State should be included, 
but rule of law must also extend to refugees, asylum seekers, returnees, and stateless persons 
residing in the State. Dworkin’s community of principle ‘commands that no-one be left out’ 
and it ‘assumes that each person is as worthy as any other’.81 One can read into this the 
protection role and the supervisory function in relation to States’ duties that are given to 
UNHCR by its Statute and the 1951 Convention with respect to refugees, asylum seekers, 
and returnees.82 UNHCR has the unique mandate to provide international protection to 
refugees. Moreover, that mandate means that it has a direct relationship with individuals of 
concern, something not common for UN agencies.83 The increased restrictions on the 
sovereignty of States since 1945, vis à vis the treatment of persons on their territory as a 
consequence of international human rights law, provides the UN with a similar role as 
regards IDPs.84 If that displacement focused analysis is accepted, then it highlights the 
																																																								
80 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule of 
Law?’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 315, 325ff, although he does 
acknowledge its limitations. Also see Hovell (n 17) 22; and the Separate Opinion of Judge 
Cançado Trindade in Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 2010, 403, esp paras 53–96. 
81 Dworkin (n 29 213. 
82 UNHCR Statute, paras 1 and 8a, 1951 Convention, arts 35 and 36, and 1967 Protocol, art 
II, all (n 6); and Türk and Garlick (n 5) 659ff. 
83 Most UN agencies, such as UNDP and UNICEF, work with governments to promote 
protection of individuals, not with the individuals, whereas you will see refugees in UNHCR 
offices. 
84 See generally on these matters, Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty, International Law and 
Democracy’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 373, 381–84; and Catherine 
Dauvergne, ‘Sovereignty, Migration and the Rule of Law in Global Times’ (2004) 67 
Modern Law Review 588. In an era of increasing disaster driven displacement, one can also 
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substantive/thick conception of rule of law for the UN, this fits with the principle in 
international law and it would facilitate operationalization by the UN at the national level. 
(b)  The indivisibility of human rights 
Since 1993, human rights have been recognized to be: 
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community 
must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and 
with the same emphasis.85 
Thus, given that rule of law has to be applied in such a way that it protects international 
human rights norms and standards, it must embrace not only civil and political rights, but 
also economic, social, and cultural rights, and it must apply to everyone within a State’s 
jurisdiction. 
																																																								
make an argument for UNHCR’s engagement in response to the protection gaps in this area 
as they impact on individuals of concern to the organization. See also by way of corollary, S 
Ratner, The Thin Justice of International Law: A Moral Reckoning of the Law of Nations 
(2015). It is interesting that Ratner uses how far a norm respects basic human rights as one 
of his twin pillars by which to assess the justice of international law. He also recognizes the 
weakness of institutions in international law by comparison with those in domestic legal 
systems, see 5, 76, 84, and esp ch 7. 
85 World Conference on Human Rights, para 5 (n 48. The General Assembly in 2013 went 
even further in its ‘Outcome Document for the Special Event of 25 September 2013’ 3: ‘We 
are resolved that the post-2015 development agenda should reinforce the international 
community’s commitment to poverty eradication and sustainable development. … It should 
also promote peace and security, democratic governance, the rule of law, gender equality 
and human rights for all’ 
<http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Outcome%20documentMDG.pdf>. See also GA 
res 67/1 (n 2) para 7; and Julinda Beqiraj and Lawrence McNamara, ‘The Rule of Law and 
Access to Justice in the Post-2015 Development Agenda: Moving Forward but Stepping 
Back’ Bingham Centre Working Paper 2014/04 (August 2014). 
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With respect to IDPs, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement86 already 
affirm their entitlement to such rights during their displacement. However, for refugees, the 
rule of law approach would strengthen their rights as set out in the 1951 Convention, 
because, although it was the first multilateral treaty to provide a range of legally binding 
economic, social, and cultural rights,87 it did not confer all those rights on every ‘refugee’.88 
Since refugee status is declaratory rather than constitutive, those rights accorded simply to 
‘refugees’, such as non-refoulement, must be available to all who have applied for refugee 
status, that is, all asylum seekers, up until it is determined that they do not fall within the 
Convention. However, other rights, such as article 17, dealing with employment, are only 
accorded to ‘refugees lawfully staying in the territory’, and can, therefore, only be available 
to refugees/asylum seekers further along in the process of status determination. A rule of law 
approach that is consistent with international human rights norms and standards, such as 
article 6 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,89 would allow all 
displaced persons to benefit from those norms and standards without the distinctions found 
in the 1951 Convention. Furthermore, as is considered below, the ‘indivisible human rights’ 
focus undermines a strict humanitarian-development dichotomy within the UN.90 
(c)  Justice outcomes, not institution building 
In the early days of the UN’s adoption of rule of law, policing, justice, and corrections were 
the objectives, and the focus had been on institution building. To an extent, this remains a 
necessary part of implementing rule of law, particularly in post-conflict societies,91 but it 
																																																								
86 UN doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998), Principles 18, 22b, and 23, along with the 
Introduction, para 1. 
87 See Michelle Foster, International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from 
Deprivation (2007); Alice Edwards, ‘Human Rights, Refugees, and The Right “To Enjoy” 
Asylum’ (2005) 17 International Journal of Refugee Law 293. 
88 See 1951 Convention (n 6) eg the right to association in art 15, or the right to wage-
earning employment in art 17. 
89 993 UNTS 3. 
90 See The humanitarian/development (false) dichotomy, part 3.3.2 (b) below. 
91 To the extent that they show that no-one in the society is above the law, see Pablo de 
Greiff, cited by Goldston (n 63 13. 
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cannot be the measure of a successful operation.92 The human rights focus entails that rule of 
law should deal with justice issues and lead to justice outcomes, that is, where success is 
measured by the improvements experienced by the population as a whole, including all 
displaced persons.93 
129.  Thus, it clearly ensues from these and the previous Reports that, to start with, the 
main concern of the UN Secretary-General and UNMIK was with the safety and the 
conditions of living of the population. It then turned to public institution-building. 
International administration of territory does not appear as an end in itself — not 
international administration of territory for territorial administration’s sake — but rather 
as a means to an end, namely, to secure the well-being of the ‘people’ or the 
‘population’, and the inhabitants living under the rule of law in a democratic society.94 
																																																								
92 See Krygier (n 3) 784–85. See also, Marshall (ed) (n 4), especially Louis-Alexandre Berg, 
Deborah Isser, and Doug Porter, ‘Beyond Deficit and Dysfunction: Three Questions Toward 
Just Development in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings’ 266ff. It is worth noting here 
that there are very few references to human rights in this chapter, possibly because the 
authors are from the World Bank – compare Alston (n 74; Galit A Sarfaty, Values in 
Translation: Human Rights and the Culture of the World Bank (2012); and Jan Klabbers, 
‘The Transformation of International Organizations Law’ (2015) 26 European Journal of 
International Law 9, 78. For a much deeper analysis of this problem, see Alvaro Santos, ‘The 
World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development’ in David M 
Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical 
Appraisal (2006) 253, 270–71. 
93 The plight of refugees starts in the source State, but continues into the State of refuge. The 
refuge State has to ensure that no-one is left behind and that applies to displaced persons 
within its borders too, see SDGs (n 53 paras 23 and 29 of the Resolution. See also Harlow (n 
14) 206, on how due process permits participation in decision-making. 
94 Cançado Trindade J (n 80 (emphasis added). And see Krygier (n 3) 786. 
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The thick, substantive approach to rule of law in the UN is rights-based, but it also enhances 
rights by facilitating access to justice.95 
3.3  The consequences of operationalizing the rule of law in the UN 
It bears reiteration that the UN is not one monolithic entity that marches to the beat of a 
single drum. Hence, interoperability within the UN could form the basis for successful 
operationalization.96 
3.3.1  Different UN actors, different understandings 
The Secretary-General’s 2004 Report description of rule of law has been adopted by the 
various actors within the UN, but on the basis of their individual mandates. Even at the level 
of inter-agency co-ordination, there are two UN bodies: the Global Focal Point on Police, 
Justice and Corrections (GFP)97 and the Rule of Law Co-ordination and Resources Group 
(RoLCRG).98 The GFP consists of: the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 
the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and UN Women. The 
GFP is led by UNDP and DPKO; it aims to strengthen rule of law in post-conflict and other 
crisis situations by delivering police, justice, and corrections assistance, as well as by 
deploying advisers, who deal with issues like detention, sexual and gender based violence 
(SGBV), or security. At the strategic level, the RoLCRG has a coordination function to 
																																																								
95 As Marshall, (n50 114, puts it, drawing on Rachel Kleinfeld, Advancing the Rule of Law 
Abroad: Next Generation Reform (2012), it is: ‘“power” and “culture”, not laws and 
institutions [that] form the roots of a rule of law state’.  
96 See Secretary-General’s Report, providing background and recommendations for the high-




98 See <http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=6>. Strangely, the UN Policy on 
Integrated Assessment and Planning, approved by the Secretary-General in April 2013, does 
not mention rule of law, but it does refer to human rights. The 2014 Integrated Assessment 
and Planning Handbook on how to carry out the policy, however, refers extensively to rule 
of law. 
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ensure coherence of rule of law within the UN; it includes a wider group of actors and has a 
much broader approach to rule of law than just securitization matters. 
3.3.2  Rule of law and forced displacement – testing the principle in extremis 
As stated, displacement provides a particularly challenging context for rule of law since it 
does not neatly fit the Westphalian model that traditionally frames international obligations 
and UN operations. It raises issues about the UN’s approach to the 2004 Statement, the 
humanitarian/development dichotomy, and the links between protection and resolution of the 
displacement. 
(a)  Displacement and the UN in the light of the 2004 Statement 
In the event of a mass displacement due to armed conflict, serious disturbances affecting 
public order, or some other humanitarian disaster, UNHCR has a mandate to protect refugees 
and asylum-seekers, to take the lead on the protection of conflict-IDPs, and to co-lead on 
shelter and camp co-ordination and camp management.99 At the onset of such an emergency, 
protection will consist of gaining access to displaced persons; safeguarding them from the 
effects of armed conflict or other generalized violence, including ensuring non-
refoulement,100 in particular, reducing the risk of SGBV, and providing emergency food and 
non-food items, including shelter; and establishing initial registration processes, as well as 
screening out those clearly excluded from refugee status. Such activities fall under both the 
narrow GFP and broad RoLCRG approaches to rule of law. The activities should involve the 
States affected and be co-ordinated with other UN bodies. Given that one of the other 
principal UN actors in such emergencies is DPKO, which heads rule of law in the 
organization, a rule of law analysis will enhance inter-agency co-operation. 
Three elements of the Secretary-General’s 2004 statement101 are fundamental to rule 
of law as it might apply in situations of displacement: the equality of all; inclusive 
																																																								
99 See UNHCR Statute (n 6); and <http://www.refworld.org/idps.html>. 
100 Compare ‘Bangladesh presses Myanmar as Rohingya flee across border’ (BBC News, 23 
November 2016) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38083901>. 
101 See 2004 Report (n 1). 
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approaches;102 and, because rule of law is both a process and an outcome for the State, it 
being solutions-focused. The three overlap and are complementary. 
Equality combined with non-discriminatory practices in situations of displacement is 
important throughout a person’s time as a refugee, asylum-seeker, or IDP.103 In terms of the 
exercise of civil and political, or economic, social, and cultural rights during the 
displacement, there must be equal access for everyone to justice, education, work, and 
shelter. Protection through proper policing and access to courts needs to be available 
alongside freedom to take up educational and employment opportunities. However, 
‘warehousing’ of refugees by the State in remote parts of the territory undermines these 
opportunities and inclusivity generally, and calls into question how far the State is upholding 
rule of law. 
In terms of inclusivity and the ultimate protection of a durable solution, that is, 
voluntary repatriation/return, resettlement/relocation, or local integration, the voices of 
displaced persons need to be heard. Where local integration is the response, refugees should 
also be able to participate, but when peace agreements and reparations are being negotiated 
in the State from which the refugees have fled, the views of those displaced across 
																																																								
102 See Dworkin (n 29. 
103 Non-discriminatory practices mean that genuine differences have to be taken into 
account, so, even where IDPs are still in their State of nationality, the special consequences 
of their displacement must be borne in mind, see Elizabeth Ferris, ‘The Dangers of 
Mainstreaming IDPs into Oblivion’ (iDMC, 29 January 2015) <http://www.internal-
displacement.org/blog/2015/guest-blogger-elizabeth-ferris-describes-the-dangers-of-
mainstreaming-idps-into-oblivion>. On the proper application of non-discrimination as 
between groups, see Geoff Gilbert, ‘Jurisprudence of the European Court and Commission 
of Human Rights in 1999 and Minority Group’, report to UN Working Group on Minorities 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2000/CRP.1 (May 2000), ‘The Burgeoning Minority Rights 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 
736, and ‘Article 5’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Rights of Minorities: A Commentary on the 
European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (2005) 156. 
Also, SDG 5.1 (n 53. 
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international borders have to be accommodated. In Leopoldo Garcia Lucero v Chile,104 the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights held that the victim should be compensated 
for being forced into exile.105 The peace arrangement concluded between Mali and the 
Tuareg rebel movement on 20 June 2015 required a tripartite agreement including UNHCR, 
which represented the Malians who had crossed into neighbouring countries, so that stability 
can be restored.106 
If equality and non-discrimination are primarily benefitting displaced persons in 
terms of rights during the displacement, inclusivity also benefits States, filtering down to 
																																																								
104 Report No 23/11 Case 12.519 Merits, Leopoldo García Lucero and Next of Kin v Chile 
(23 March 2011), referred to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on 20 September 
2011. The Court declined to deal with the issues surrounding exile, only because it took 
place in 1975 before Chile accepted the jurisdiction of the Court on 21 August 1990, see 
García Lucero et al v Chile, Judgment (Preliminary Objection, Merits and Reparations) 28 
August 2013, I/A Court HR, Series C No 267 (2013) paras 35–36 
<http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/jurisprudencia>. 
105 For early examples of this, see Truce agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina (17 July 1992) 
para 3: ‘We agree that all refugees will be permitted to return to the places from which they 
have been expelled and that civilians who are caught up in, or trapped by the military 
situation will be given freedom of movement’; and Dar-Es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, 
Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region (19–20 November 2004) 
para 69: ‘Ensure that refugees and displaced persons, upon return to their areas of origin, 
recover their property with the assistance of the local traditional and administrative 
authorities’. The authors are grateful to Dr Tiina Pajuste of the Lauterpacht Centre for 
International Law, Cambridge, for these references. 
106 See <http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205404475_text> and 
<http://www.insightonconflict.org/2014/07/road-peace-mali-political-roadblocks-
obstacles/>. See also the New York Declaration (n 5) Annex 1: Comprehensive refugee 
response framework, para 12(e); Jennifer Easterday, ‘The Rule of Law at the National and 
International Levels in Post-Conflict Peace Agreements’ in Kanetake and Nollkaemper (eds) 
(n 17) 390–92; and Roger Duthie (ed), Transitional Justice and Displacement (2012). Of 
course, anyone excluded under art 1F of the 1951 Convention cannot be represented by 
UNHCR, although they are the sorts of person who may well have been senior members of 
rebel movements prior to displacement. 
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benefit all persons in the territory. No-one would deny that hosting a displaced population is 
a burden on the State.107 Therefore, the State should include displaced persons in their 
development planning to ensure its own affairs are managed whilst meeting the needs of 
those displaced onto its territory; and responsibility sharing by the international community 
is required. The same is true in reverse for States in transition as the population who left 
during the conflict returns.108 These situations focus rule of law approaches on promoting 
solutions to displacement: if the individuals’ rights are being met in a State where they are 
part of the development programme, that will facilitate their local integration, resettlement, 
or their capacity to return, and it will avoid the UN having to create a parallel State structure 
for them. If this is to work, the various UN actors have to work in a co-ordinated fashion, 
especially UNHCR and UNDP.109 Moreover, such inter-agency co-operation with a view to 
solutions must commence at the outset of the crisis, not just when the humanitarian phase is 
declared to be over. Solutions and protection are complementary, as will be explored further 
below, with the corollary that developmental actors need to be engaged from the outset.110 In 
this regard, Marshall111 is wrong to suggest that ‘the early stages of UN field operations are 
not an appropriate context for comprehensive approaches’. He may be right that ‘[l]arge, 
																																																								
107 See Press Release, ‘Forced Displacement: A Developing World Crisis’ (World Bank, 15 
September 2016) <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/09/15/forced-
displacement-a-developing-world-crisis.print>. See also New York Declaration (n 5), and 
the affirmation of shared responsibility. 
108 See UN Development Action Framework (UNDAF) <https://undg.org> and UN 
Democracy Fund <http://www.un.org/democracyfund/about-undef>. 
109 To an extent, this is the basis of the cluster approach for IDPs, see Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee on the Cluster approach <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/product-
categories/cluster-approach>. The 2008 inventory by the Secretary-General of UN rule of 
law activities included 92 by UNHCR that prioritized protection and solutions for displaced 
persons. 
110 See Preamble to ExCom Conclusion 112 (n 5): ‘Stressing the importance of the 
protection of human life and dignity as a priority issue by reaffirming, inter alia, the 
principle of non-refoulement, as well as the importance of providing assistance and seeking 
comprehensive approaches towards the implementation of durable solutions, as appropriate, 
from the outset of a displacement situation, while ensuring that no-one is left behind …’. 
111 See (n 50 120. 
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comprehensive programmes have resulted in large, comprehensive failures’, but this 
suggests that the UN has not viewed rule of law as a process, rather than as an end-state. 
UNHCR, UNICEF and UNDP, along with DPKO where appropriate, should participate in 
registration and documentation with the government, for example, so that all displaced 
persons can participate in the longer-term rule of law programmes.112 
(b)  The humanitarian/development (false) dichotomy113 
If economic, social, and cultural rights are fully implemented within the rule of law, then the 
rights to work and shelter must be given prominence alongside freedom from arbitrary 
detention.114 Given that the modal average length of a protracted refugee situation is around 
20 years, priorities will inevitably change and the humanitarian crisis that prompted flight 
will become a situation of protracted displacement. The displaced will then need to be seen 
as part of the development plans for the State of refuge as it continues to uphold the 
fundamental guarantee of non-refoulement.115 
																																																								
112 See Goldston (n 63 22. See ‘UNHCR Helps Displaced Iraqis Acquire Vital 
Documentation’ <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2017/7/596dcb2f4/unhcr-helps-
displaced-iraqis-acquire-vital-documentation.html>. 
113 See New York Declaration (n 5) para 85, and Annex 1, para 2. See also ExCom 
Conclusion 112 (n 5) paras 9 and 12. 
114 See eg the plight of the 31,000 IDPs in Zamboanga city on Mindanao in the Philippines 
who lack access to secure housing, there was no early recovery strategy after the 
humanitarian phase and the development sector was slow to engage. See iDMC, ‘Global 
Overview 2015: People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence’ (May 2015) 60–61. 
115 Cartagena +30, ‘Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action: A Framework for Cooperation 
and Regional Solidarity to Strengthen the International Protection of Refugees, Displaced 
and Stateless Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean’ (Brasilia, 3 December 2014) 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/5487065b4.html>. See Goldston (n 63 22, on how 
documentation gives access to education and health care eg for marginalized communities 
like refugees. See also Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson, ‘UN Deputy Chief Calls for 
Greater Integration Efforts to Meet Challenges of Refugees in Urban Areas’ (18 May 2016) 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53971#.V8fenmXns7M>. In addition, 
see the UNHCR-OECD Memorandum of Understanding (15 June 2016) para 2, which sets 
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13) … the inadequate response to the needs of IDPs and refugees, particularly to 
developmental needs continues to be the single major obstacle to durable solutions for 
displaced persons. The continued perception that concerns of displacement can only be 
addressed by humanitarian means is ill-conceived and has resulted in the protracted 
displacements of millions of IDPs and refugees, unable to find solutions for their 
displacement that can assist them to break from the cycle of dependence on 
humanitarian assistance and to move on with their lives.116 
Rule of law approaches that are underpinned by all human rights and whole society 
participation facilitate this understanding and promote stability and development in the State 
of refuge and the State of return.117 Equally, they promote interoperability between UNHCR 
and UNDP and the World Bank. 
																																																								
out substantive collaboration in relation to the protection and integration of refugees who are 
to be included in development programmes. See also, ILO Recommendation 205, 
‘Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience Recommendation, 2017’, and 
‘Jordan Compact 2016’ <data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=12008>. 
116 Concept Note (n 9). Also, EU Press Release, 240/16 (12 May 2016), calls for ‘[a] 
coherent, development-led approach to forced displacement’ (paras 5–8). 
117 Concept Note (n 9): ‘14) … In both fragile and conflict affected countries, and in 
countries with robust institutional and governance frameworks, displacement can also 
become the setting for human rights violations and a breeding ground for serious grievances 
leading to conflict, general violence, crime and instability and further displacement’. See 
also Goldston (n 63 20; and GA res 67/1 (n 2) para 7: ‘We are convinced that the rule of law 
and development are strongly interrelated and mutually reinforcing, that the advancement of 
the rule of law at the national and international levels is essential for sustained and inclusive 
economic growth, sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and hunger and the 
full realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to 
development, all of which in turn reinforce the rule of law, and for this reason we are 
convinced that this interrelationship should be considered in the post-2015 international 
development agenda’. The Global Compact on Refugees to be concluded in 2018 also adopts 
this approach, see UNHCR, ‘Towards a Global Compact on Refugees: a Proposed 
Roadmap’ (17 May 2017) para 10 <http://www.unhcr.org/58e625aa7>. 
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(c)  Protection, solutions, and rule of law118 
Very closely related to the humanitarian/development dichotomy is the question of 
protection and solutions.119 These two concepts are difficult to separate completely and both 
promote and are enhanced by rule of law approaches. Part of the problem has been to view 
solutions in the wake of displacement as relating only to durable and sustainable solutions: 
voluntary repatriation/return, resettlement/relocation, and local integration. This 
understanding tends to focus protection on documentation/registration and non-refoulement, 
the core, immediate rights (and needs) of the refugee.120 That renders all other human rights 
to which displaced persons are entitled in a rule of law State as secondary. This approach 
fails to recognise protection as part of solutions121 and that solutions, broadly conceived, are 
part of on-going protection, a process.122 First, registration/documentation allows a displaced 
																																																								
118 Some of the examples that appear in this next section came to light during the field trips 
the authors undertook as part of their UNHCR consultancy in late 2014. The authors are 
grateful to UNHCR for permission to use this material. 
119 See ‘The Centrality of Protection in Humanitarian Action’ endorsed by the IASC 
Principals (17 December 2013) 
<https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/principals/content/centrality-protection-
humanitarian-action>. See also, the Brazil Declaration (n 115). 
120 See Guy S Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd edn, 
2007) 335ff, esp 343–45. 
121 See how UNHCR’s use of its Biometric Identity Management System for refugees from 
Myanmar/Burma in camps in Thailand provided registration data that helps UNHCR target 
assistance more accurately as the situation in Myanmar/Burma changes. The operation was 
carried out jointly with the Royal Thai Government with the support of civil society. See 
‘UNHCR’s New Biometrics System Helps Verify 110,000 Myanmar Refugees in Thailand’ 
(30 June 2015) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5594f7594.html>. For information on how 
UNHCR protects the privacy rights of those on whom it holds such data, see UNHCR, 
‘Policy on the Protection of the Personal Data of Persons of Concern to UNHCR’ (15 May 
2015) <http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain>. 
122 See Global Compact Proposed Roadmap (n 117 para 32(b). 
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person to access their rights, thus facilitating, as will be seen, solutions.123 For example, the 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre has carried out a global study that shows that 
IDPs’ inability to register their children at birth can result in statelessness and also a range of 
other human rights violations.124 
The registration of children born to IDPs and the assistance and protection it unlocks 
also helps to prevent violations of their rights, including child labour, sexual 
exploitation, trafficking, early marriage and recruitment into the military and NSAGs. 
[A Norwegian Refugee Council] study on the living conditions of IDPs and host 
communities in the eastern DRC city of Goma showed that displaced children who were 
not registered and did not receive assistance were more likely to be recruited into child 
labour. 
If registered, it is much easier for children to enter the education system.125 Moreover, 
improving access to education for children increases the likelihood that they will be in a 
position to take up opportunities for durable solutions.126 Equally, while a child is in school, 
it is much more difficult for them to be exploited and abused, enhancing protection. The 
same arguments, mutatis mutandis, apply to access to employment and training for displaced 
																																																								
123 See New York Declaration (n 5) paras 71 and 75, and Annex 1, para 5(d), along with 
ExCom Conclusion 112 (n 5) para 2; and UNGA res 71/148 (n 2) para 20. 
124 See iDMC Discussion Paper, ‘Getting on the List: The Registration of Children Born to 
IDPs’ (15 May 2015) <http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/2015/getting-on-
the-list-the-registration-of-children-born-to-idps>. See also SDG 16.9 (n 53: ‘By 2030, 
provide legal identity for all, including birth registration’; and New York Declaration (n 5) 
Annex 1, para 5(f). 
125 See ‘Birth Certificates Issued by Mali Open Doors for Mauritanian Refugee Children’ 
(UNHCR News, 20 April 2015) <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=5534fc0f1b&query=Birth%20certificates%20issue
d%20by%20Mali%20open%20doors%20for%20Mauritanian%20refugee%20children>. See 
also Global Partnership on Education <http://www.globalpartnership.org>; and the New 
York Declaration (n 5) paras 81 and 82. 
126 New York Declaration (n 5) Annex 1, para 13(b). 
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persons, especially since much of the crime within camps arises from enforced idleness.127 
Thus, while the ultimate goal is to find durable and sustainable solutions for displaced 
persons, giving them access to their rights during their displacement is part of the on-going 
solutions process.128 Access to rights is a requirement that a rule of law State upholding all 
its international obligations must meet vis à vis displaced persons on its territory and that 
concomitantly will promote their protection. A solution, therefore, like rule of law, should be 
seen as a process, the progressive resolution of the situation, not simply an outcome in some 
end-state. Additionally, it is a process that can be furthered through developmental 
approaches and thus should be shared with the State and other UN actors. 
3.3.3  Rule of law in practice 
Displaced persons’ protection and access to solutions should be a part of any UN operation, 
regardless of whether a narrow or broad rule of law approach has been adopted. Policing, 
justice, and corrections promote security from violence and exploitation,129 and can also 
																																																								
127 See Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 120 345, fn 416, quoting the Assistant High 
Commissioner’s speech (Copenhagen, 23 October 2002) pointing out that camps are not a 
natural consequence of displacement, but are ‘established in response to political realities 
and constraints’. 
128 See ‘Decision No. 2011/20 - Durable Solutions: Follow up to the Secretary-General’s 
2009 report on peacebuilding’ (4 October 2011), following up on ‘Ending Displacement in 
the Aftermath of Conflict: Preliminary Framework for Supporting a more coherent, 
predictable and effective response to the durable solutions needs of refugee returnees and 
internally displaced persons’ <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5242d12b7.html>, particularly 
para (ii) of the Decision, and 1D, para 12 of the Preliminary Framework. 
129 See also Guidance Note of the Secretary-General, ‘Reparations for Conflict-Related 
Sexual Violence 2014’ 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Press/GuidanceNoteReparationsJune-2014.pdf>. 
Security from crime in camps can also be furthered through a rule of law approach that 
builds up the capacity of the State and displaced persons themselves with respect to policing; 
mobile courts that can visit camps further promote rule of law in situations of displacement, 
see UN Somalia Integrated Strategic Framework 2014–16, kindly supplied by UNDP and 
with the authors. 
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enhance access to legal assistance and legal remedies,130 improve reception conditions, and 
further peaceful coexistence with local communities. The broader understanding of rule of 
law within the UN calls for laws that are ‘consistent with international human rights norms 
and standards’ from States that are ‘accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, [and] 
equally enforced’, thus embracing all displaced persons. Furthermore, in terms of 
interoperability, a rule of law approach would allow UNHCR to widen its range of activities 
on behalf of displaced persons by drawing more fully on the expertise of other UN actors 
and by deploying its limited resources to protection issues. For instance, engaging with 
OHCHR, it could take on a more comprehensive role with respect to human rights treaty 
bodies and their ability to provide protection.131 
As part of the UN Somalia Integrated Strategic Framework 2014–16,132 the UN 
adopted an approach to rule of law that included not only ‘police, justice and corrections’, 
but also ‘security, gender equality, human rights, [and] advocacy for IDP protection’. A 
broad rule of law approach, with both formal and substantive components, permeates the 
entire Framework; cross-cutting issues are identified as: human rights, stabilization, gender, 
and capacity building of the government so that, in part, it can fulfil all its human rights 
obligations. Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goal 3 incorporated access to justice for 
displaced persons in the rule of law based protection analysis. As part of any rule of law 
																																																								
130 Compare Vivek Maru, ‘Legal Empowerment and the Land Rush: Three Struggles’ in 
Marshall (ed) (n 4) 205. 
131 See also Marshall (n 50 115–19. Additionally, working with the host State and OHCHR, 
the host State could launch a claim before the Human Rights Committee under art 41 against 
a completely intransigent source State as part of the former’s obligations to all persons in its 
territory or jurisdiction. Such a move would be revolutionary and go beyond all current 
activities, but would fit a rule of law based approach and highlight on the world stage the 
situation of protracted displaced persons, even if any victory might be pyrrhic. 
132 Document kindly supplied by UNDP and with the authors. See also Somali National 
Development Plan 2017–19 <http://www.mopic.gov.so/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/National-Development-Plan-Summary.pdf>, which makes repeated 
references to the rule of law. 
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engagement, the UN should be promoting human rights treaty ratification, which coincides 
with UNHCR’s mandate.133 
In terms of the broad approach to rule of law issues and outcomes within a State, one 
of the major problems in situations of displacement is that land is a fixed and often limited 
commodity that is never terra nullius.134 Therefore, providing land to displaced persons is 
not simple. It requires discussion with the government at national and local levels to 
introduce legislation that reflects principles of equality, fairness, certainty, and transparency, 
where this is lacking, and that complies with international standards. Consulting with the 
national population and with displaced persons during the drafting phase will help to ensure 
rule of law compliant legislation that takes full account of the displacement-specific needs of 
refugees and IDPs, particularly in a context of very limited resources. Clearly, these changes 
should be part of the national planning exercises of the government, undertaken with other 
UN actors, such as UNDP and UN Habitat.135 
In some cases, the land issues are very complex. The displaced persons may need 
something other than a transfer of individual title; for instance, they may have a collective 
approach to land ownership, or their livelihoods may depend on general access to vast 
swathes of territory already used by the national population. In these cases, the 
																																																								
133 See 1950 Statute (n 6) para 8a. Specifically, with UNDP, UNHCR is engaging in police 
training on, amongst other matters, GBV. 
134 See Norwegian Refugee Council/International Federation of the Red Cross, ‘The 
Importance of Addressing Housing, Land and Property (HLP): Challenges in Humanitarian 
Response’ (2016) <http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Documents/Secretariat/Shelter/IFRC-
NRC%20HLP%20report%202016.pdf>. See also SU-039/97 (3 February 1997), T-821/07 
(October 2007), and T-267/11 (April 2011), Colombian Constitutional Court, cited in 
OHCHR, ‘Land and Human Rights: Annotated Compilation of Case Law’ 75–77 (2015), on 
how land issues interrelate to other aspects of rights, rule of law, and the protection of 
displaced persons. 
135 See Colombian Law No 1448 on Victims and Land Restitution of 2011, as well as, 
Constitutional Court, decision T-312/10 
<http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2010/T-312-10.htm> (thanks are due to 
Camilo Sánchez of Dejusticia for this material). See also New York Declaration (n 5) Annex 
1, para 11. 
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developmental aspects of rule of law can benefit solutions: for instance, a complex, multi-
faceted land registration project within the UN Development Assistance Framework, as a 
product of work with UNDP, advocating alongside UN Habitat, as well as capacity building 
with the government at national level, would help to ensure durable and sustainable solutions 
for displaced persons.136 In sum, land is a multifaceted issue because it is pertinent from the 
moment of arrival through to any eventual durable and sustainable solution. Moreover, 
housing, land, and property, and other areas of intervention, are characterized by 
interdependence: housing, land, and property depend on proper documentation and 
registration, while physical security and protection from SGBV benefits from secure and 
stable housing.137 Often, housing, land, and property cannot be considered separately from 
other measures that aim to provide protection and solutions to displaced persons. 
3.4  Rule of law as the only effective response for international organizations 
The problematique of displacement reveals how a rule of law approach provides a 
comprehensive and effective response to a challenging global problem. Rule of law 
facilitates seeing the different areas of UNHCR’s engagement with displaced persons and 
governments (in source and refuge States) as interlinked, which only in combination realize 
the full panoply of rights to which displaced persons are entitled. UNHCR clearly benefits 
from a rule of law based approach because: (i) the international human rights standards, on 
which it would ordinarily rely in discussions with the State, are not always fully developed 
with respect to displaced persons to achieve the desired ends; (ii) a functioning government 
that can uphold, after capacity building, its own fair and equitable laws is essential if 
displaced persons are to return or integrate locally; and (iii) other UN actors whose primary 
																																																								
136 For example, Niger ranks 187th out of 188 States in UNDP’s Humanitarian Development 
Report for 2016 <http://hdr.undp.org/en>, and its UNDAF should reflect that the 
government, with the local chefs du village, have provided grazing rights to refugee Malian 
nomads and building plots to Nigerians fleeing Boko Haram; see World bank’s IDA Fund 
<http://ida.worldbank.org/results/country/niger>. Also see iDMC, ‘Urban Informal Settlers’ 
(June 2015) and ‘Home Sweet Home’ (May 2015) <http://www.internal-displacement.org>. 
137 UNDP-UNHCR Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI) Joint Programme, Durable 
Solutions through enhanced self-reliance for refugees, internally displaced persons and host 
communities in Eastern Sudan, 
<http://www.sd.undp.org/content/dam/sudan/docs/project_docs/cp16%20UNDP-
UNHCR%20JP%20ProDoc%2012%20Feb.pdf> para 27. 
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focus is developmental can assist in ensuring that solutions are durable and sustainable as 
part of a wider national plan.138 
UNHCR has a unique mandate for refugees, returnees, asylum seekers, and IDPs, but 
this does not mean it needs to shoulder the entire burden itself if it needs to establish a 
parallel State for displaced persons. The substantive/thick rule of law, in the broad form 
adopted by the UN, encompasses the current rights and needs focus, but starts with the 
premise that the State will provide protection and facilitate durable and sustainable solutions, 
possibly in conjunction with the more development-focused UN agencies. Certainly, 
UNHCR may have to engage in capacity building and monitor State activities, in line with 
its article 35 supervisory function, to enable the State to provide protection, but that is 
preferable to having to act as a substitute for the State.139 A State with a properly functioning 
legal system that ensures equality before the law will allow displaced persons to claim their 
rights and obtain protection. In addition, the rule of law approach better accommodates the 
reality of displacement. Very few situations, either cross-border or internal, are short-term, 
where the displaced persons can soon return home. In many cases, displacement is protracted 
and the immediate protection paradigm of shelter, food, and distribution of non-food items 
could soon become a culture of dependency. A rule of law approach that engages with the 
State and with other UN actors has a greater chance of facilitating UNHCR’s operation in 
that State and of including displaced persons in national planning strategies that will enhance 




138 See, Concept Note (n 9); and <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e492ad6.html>; East Sudan 
TSI (n 137; Colombia (n 10); and Somalia Initiative (n 132. 









Furthermore, a rule of law approach by the UN may further two implicit goals: 
reliance on international human rights norms and standards, where the State is not party to a 
particular treaty; and not having to use human rights language in a State that treats 
international human rights law as a tool of the global north. Because rule of law was 
reaffirmed by the General Assembly in the 2012 Declaration,140 it is easier to argue that 
States ought to implement measures that can be said to derive from the Secretary-General’s 
2004 report.141 At one level, rule of law was introduced after the concepts of human rights 
and international protection did not achieve the results for which people had hoped. It 
attaches obligations to States by appealing to something to which they had already 
committed, without needing ratification, a decision of some international court, or the 
intervention of the Security Council.142 If that is the aim, however, in the context of rule of 
law it may be misplaced. International law is created in various ways to which States have 
consented. If States have adopted a procedure for the creation of laws that does not oblige 
them to assume international human rights norms and standards,143 does reading those 
obligations back in, via the UN’s understanding of rule of law, risk procedural irregularity 
that undermines the very essence of rule of law as accepted by the theorists? If this is an 
implicit consequence of the broad approach to a substantive/thick rule of law adopted by the 
UN, then it raises questions concerning ‘procedural and legal transparency’. To be sure, 
thick rule of law requires a human-centric approach that promotes the protection of the 
individual, but it equally respects the law pertaining to treaties and customary international 
law. It also provides the basis for asking how rule of law applies within the UN. 
4.  RULE OF LAW/RECHTSSTAAT FOR THE UN AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
																																																								
140 See UNGA res 67/1 (n 2). 
141 See ‘Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion’ ICJ Rep 226 
(8 July 1996) para 70. 
142 McCorquodale (n 1) 294. Also see Alvarez (n 12) 33–34. 
143 See Besson (n 84 383–84. The ‘thick’ approach to rule of law (Bingham (n 18)) runs the 
risk of seeming to sneak human rights in via the back door. See also Chesterman (n 18) 360. 
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The 2012 General Assembly Declaration states that the rule of law applies just as much to 
the UN.144 How, if at all, does a rule of law approach fit with the responsibility of 
international organizations in international law?145 The responsibility of international 
organizations in general raises a plethora of issues that are beyond the remit of this article,146 
but applying rule of law principles in situations of displacement involves international 
organizations in interactions with States – some that are members of those organizations, 
some possibly not; with other international organizations; with NGOs; and with 
individuals.147 To the extent that the UN interacts directly with individuals, then quite clearly 
the 2012 Declaration assumes that it will uphold the rule of law. However, not being a 
sovereign State with all the attributes, functions, and powers that a State would possess, 
there may need to be some modifications as to its implementation. And if rule of law applies 
just as much to the UN, then what are the internal consequences? This last mentioned aspect 
is rarely addressed, if at all, in discussions on rule of law in an international context.148 
It is not enough to refer to the 2012 Declaration and simply assert that as a 
consequence rule of law applies to the UN. A General Assembly Declaration does not 
																																																								
144 See UNGA res 67/1 (n 2). 
145 See ILC, ‘Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations’ UN doc 
A/66/10 (2011) (DARIO). The status of the Draft Articles is unclear, but they are used here 
to illustrate the problems of holding an international organization accountable with respect to 
rule of law objectives, see also Michael Wood, ‘“Weighing” the Articles on Responsibility 
of International Organizations’ in Maurizio Ragazzi (ed), Responsibility of International 
Organizations (2013). 
146 See generally Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2nd edn, 
2011); the very full discussion in Klabbers (n 92; and Kristina Daugirdas, ‘Reputation and 
the Responsibility of International Organizations’ (2014) 25 European Journal of 
International Law 991. Also see Alvarez (n 12); and McCorquodale (n 1). 
147 Where UNHCR has the statutory mandate. Of course, the State remains potentially liable 
as well, see DARIO (n 145 art 19. See also Affaire D et autres c Turquie App no 24245/03 
(ECtHR, Third Section, 22 June 2006). 
148 There is a tendency to treat the UN as one monolithic organization, even if there are hints 
of some dysfunctionality - see Marshall (ed) (n 4). Compare Kanetake and Nollkaemper 
(eds) (n 17); Alston (n 74; and, Sarfaty, Klabbers, and Santos, all (n 92. 
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establish international law in and of itself, although it may reflect customary international 
law that might be binding on the UN as much as States. And that would still leave open 
questions about the scope of those obligations, how they might be implemented and issues of 
accountability and immunity. If, however, the UN were to be unaccountable for its own 
actions, then a principal actor in humanitarian crises would be outside the rule of law.149 As 
Hovell has commented, due process grants legitimacy: ‘Safeguards associated with due 
process aim collectively to open up a structured dialogue between decision-making authority 
and those affected by decisions. Broadly, the aim of this dialogue is to enhance 
legitimacy’.150 Hovell’s understanding of due process would embrace similar values to 
																																																								
149 See Ratner (n 84 262. See also, Palombella (n 14) 10; Harlow (n 14) 191; Alvarez (n 12) 
24–25, along with James Crawford, cited by Alvarez at fn 29, 10; Christian Tomuschat, ‘The 
Security Council and Jus Cogens’ in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed), The Present and Future of Jus 
Cogens (2015) 7, paras 70 and 71: ‘It is a derivative institution like the world organization as 
a whole while States have their own legitimacy by virtue of the pouvoir constituant of their 
peoples. The UN, by contrast, is still a child of the States having established it by virtue of 
an international treaty. Accordingly, the member States are still the masters of the world 
organization, being able additionally to leave it if they so wish …. Whoever was born from 
the law and within the law, must respect the law. It cannot argue that it has a higher raison 
d’être permitting it to disregard its foundation in accordance with political convenience’. 
Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the 
Security Council’ (1970) 64 American Journal of International Law 1; and Nabil Sayadi and 
Patricia Vinck v Belgium, CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (29 December 2008) Individual opinion 
(partly dissenting) by Committee members, Sir Nigel Rodley, Mr Ivan Shearer, and Ms Iulia 
Antoanella Motoc, 27: ‘We acknowledge, of course, that the authors may have been unjustly 
harmed by operation of the extravagant powers the Security Council has arrogated to itself, 
including the obstacles it has created to the correction of error. It is more than a little 
disturbing that the executive branches of 15 Member States appear to claim a power, with 
none of the consultation or checks and balances that would be applicable at the national 
level, to simply discard centuries of States’ constitutional traditions of providing bulwarks 
against exorbitant and oppressive executive action’. 
150 See Hovell (n 17) 4. Also see Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and 
Institutions (1995). 
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substantive/thick rule of law, as explained in this article.151 Modern, post-1945 Rechtsstaat, 
incorporating common law rule of law values that restrain the sovereign, embraces the 
constitutional structures that should shape how the UN acts in its operations and the coherent 
framework for the organization in terms of operationalizing interoperability. Thus, while 
responsibility may entail accountability in some form for the UN, if it adopts rule of law, it 
aids its legitimacy as an actor in humanitarian crises.152 
According to the ILC DARIO, ‘[e]very internationally wrongful act of an 
international organization entails the international responsibility of that organization’;153 the 
Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the 
National and International Levels of 2012 proclaims that all institutions are ‘accountable to 
… laws’.154 Thus, to the extent that an international organization is responsible for an 
internationally wrongful act, it should be accountable.155 Article 4 of the DARIO provides as 
follows: 
Article 4 
Elements of an internationally wrongful act of an international organization 
																																																								
151 See Hovell (n 17) 3. Hovell bases many of her arguments relating to due process on cases 
that other authors use with respect to rule of law - see Kanetake and Nollkaemper (eds) (n 
17) - but see Hovell, at 17. 
152 On the nuanced relationship between responsibility and accountability, see Tony Honoré, 
Responsibility and Fault (2002) 3, 10–11, 130–33: ‘Accepting responsibility for our actions 
makes for a better society because it encourages us to do well and to enjoy the credit that 
comes from doing well. Above all, the system of responsibility is essential to our self-respect 
and our respect for others’ 10. See also Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: 
International Law and How We Use It (1994) 147–48; Alvarez (n 12) 24–25; Loughlin (n 3) 
340–41. The authors are indebted to colleagues, the late Sir Nigel Rodley and Paul Hunt, for 
the discussions on this topic and the additional complications that arise when trying to apply 
it to international organizations. 
153 See DARIO (n 145 art 3. 
154 See UNGA res 67/1 (n 2) para 2. 
155 See Honoré (n 152 3–4. 
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There is an internationally wrongful act of an international organization when conduct 
consisting of an action or omission: 
(a)  is attributable to that organization under international law; and 
(b)  constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that organization. 
The question is, therefore, whether the failure to uphold rule of law principles in relation to 
the State, an individual, or other international organizations ‘constitutes a breach of an 
international obligation of that organization’. According to article 33.1, the DARIO of 2011 
are geared towards responsibility to States and as between international organizations 
themselves,156 although article 33.2 asserts that it is without prejudice to the responsibility of 
an international organization that might ‘accrue directly to any person or entity other than a 
State or an international organization’. It is unlikely that failure by one part of the UN to co-
operate with another would amount to an internationally wrongful act, so the DARIO have 
little directly to add to interoperability. An exception might be a World Bank programme 
that failed properly to respect non-refoulement, but it is unlikely in such circumstances that 
the DARIO would provide the appropriate framework for UNHCR’s response. As for 
responsibility that might accrue directly in international law to individuals who are 
displaced, that might facilitate rule of law and may indirectly promote interoperability. 
4.1  International organizations and the source of accountability to individuals157 
How might an international organization be accountable to individuals for its actions?158 If 
such accountability could be operationalized, might there be cases where it promotes 
																																																								
156 See Mateja S Platiše, ‘The Development of the Immunities of International Organizations 
in response to Domestic Contestations’ in Kanetake and Nollkaemper (eds) (n 17) 84. As for 
the UN’s responsibility to Member States, the UN and its organs are accountable through the 
General Assembly under the various reporting mechanisms and through any Memorandum 
of Understanding with that State. The situation might sometimes be more complicated 
because the UN is made up of and acts on behalf of those self-same States, see Klabbers (n 
92 25ff and 54–55; and James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of International Law (8th 
edn, 2012) 580ff. 
157 Alvarez (n 12) 15. 
158 An individual has no right of audience before the ICJ, States cannot seek a review of the 
decision of any UN organ before the ICJ, only organs of the UN can seek an Advisory 
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interoperability? The starting point must be to determine which obligations of an 
international organization give rise to duties towards individuals. If such obligations arise, 
then the ways in which accountability might be effected and implemented will need to be 
explored. Failure to provide an effective accountability mechanism undermines the rule of 
law. 
The obligations of an international organization are found in its constituent 
documents and in the international instruments under which it is bound. For the UN, that 
would primarily be its Charter. The purposes of the UN, set out in article 1, include 
achieving ‘international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, 
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion’. While the UN does not ratify the international human rights law 
treaties that it promulgates, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been said to 
establish a set of norms for the organization.159 
In the crucible of mass displacement, how should this be understood? UNHCR’s 
mandate is declared in its Statute, but it has expanded considerably so that a much broader 
																																																								
Opinion of the ICJ to query the validity of a decision. See generally White (n 73 206–16, for 
a detailed discussion of these matters. 
159 As to the institutionally binding quality of the UDHR within the UN, see Eibe H Riedel, 
‘Article 55(c)’ in Bruno Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations (2nd edn, 2002) vol 
II, 917–27, where it is argued that there is wide acceptance that art 55(c) of the UN Charter 
is binding on the organization (920 and 922–23) and that the UDHR represents the first step 
by UN organs to realize ‘the programme enshrined in Article 55(c)’ (925). See also 
Guglielmo Verdirame, The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the Guardians? (2011); 
Geoff Gilbert, ‘Implementing Protection: what refugee law can learn from IDP law … and 
vice versa’ in Geoff Gilbert, Françoise Hampson, and Clara Sandoval (eds), The Delivery of 
Human Rights (2011); Niamh Kinchin, ‘The Implied Human Rights Obligations of UNHCR’ 
(2016) 28 International Journal of Refugee Law 251; and Frédéric Mégret and Florian 
Hoffmann, ‘The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United Nations 
Changing Human Rights Responsibilities’ (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 314. 
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range of persons are now of concern to the High Commissioner.160 Moreover, as well as the 
international human rights law obligations arising from the Charter, UNHCR’s Statute sets 
out, in paragraph 1, that it ‘shall assume the function of providing international protection … 
to refugees’, thus providing another avenue for attributing responsibilities towards those 
displaced. UNHCR’s Statute defines protection, in paragraph 8, in broad terms that 
incorporate promoting the conclusion and ratification of international conventions, 
promoting through special agreements with governments measures calculated to improve the 
situation of refugees, as well as facilitating the co-ordination of the efforts of private 
organizations concerned with the welfare of refugees.161 Furthermore, the cluster 
approach,162 where UNHCR has the lead for international protection and the co-lead on 
shelter and camp co-ordination and camp management for conflict-IDPs, brings together 
various UN actors, once again for protection and humanitarian assistance and, in this case, 
interoperability is explicit. If all those UN actors who engage directly with individuals 
affected by displacement follow the 2012 General Assembly Declaration, they must promote 
the rule of law, a common approach that should equally promote interoperability.163 
																																																								
160 UNHCR Statute (n 6); and Türk and Eyster (n 7). See also Guy S Goodwin-Gill, ‘The 
Movements of People between States in the 21st Century: An Agenda for Urgent 
Institutional Change’ (2016) 28 International Journal of Refugee Law 679. 
161 Para 10 goes on to provide that the ‘High Commissioner shall administer any funds, 
public or private, which he receives for assistance to refugees, and shall distribute them 
among the private and, as appropriate, public agencies which he deems best qualified to 
administer such assistance’ (emphasis added). 
162 See Inter-Agency Standing Committee (n 109. 
163 The experience of the authors in Colombia, during the consultancy for UNHCR, was that 
the UN’s Resident Co-ordinator was fundamental to the concerted approach to IDPs by 
UNHCR, OHCHR and UNDP alongside the government, all of whom had adopted a rule of 
law approach. See also the TSI (n 9) and (n 10). For an example of an international 
organization promoting rule of law with respect to the privacy of individuals with whom it 
acts, see UNHCR’s policy on data protection for persons of concern to the High 
Commissioner, UNHCR, UNHCR’s New Biometrics System (n 121). 
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Beyond constituent instruments, international organizations can be bound by general 
international law.164 Peremptory norms that protect individuals should clearly be binding.165 
In this particular context, Responsibility to Protect166 (R2P) could establish a set of 
obligations for international organizations. In this regard, it must be noted that R2P is more 
than simply a justification to intervene in a State through the use of force sanctioned under 
chapter VII. In his follow-up to the World Summit Document 2005, the Secretary-General 
established a three pillar strategy for R2P.167 Pillar 2 deals with international assistance and 
capacity building: as paragraph 43 makes clear, ‘chronic underdevelopment … can 
exacerbate the competition for scarce resources and severely limit the capacity of the State, 
civil society, and regional and sub-regional organizations to resolve domestic tensions 
peacefully and fully’.168 The Secretary-General went on to emphasize the importance of rule 
of law capacity building in this context: 
																																																								
164 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 73 (20 December 1980) para 48. 
165 See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening) ICJ Rep 
99 (3 February 2012); Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, and the suspension of 
South Africa by the World Meteorological Organization as a consequence of apartheid, 
referred to in Klabbers (n 92. Also see DARIO (n 145 art 26; and the International Law 
Association, ‘Final Report of the Committee on the Accountability of International 
Organisations’ (Berlin 2004) 26ff. 
166 See World Summit Outcome 2005 (n 64 paras 138–40: ‘139 … In this context, we are 
prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and 
in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’. See also paras 11 and 
134. 
167 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect’ UN doc 
A/63/677 (12 January 2009) paras 28–48. The authors are grateful to Sabrina Rau, LLM 
2015–16, for the discussions on this topic as part of her masters dissertation. 
168 See (n 64 para 44: ‘What is most needed, from the perspective of the responsibility to 
protect, are assistance programmes that are carefully targeted to build specific capacities 
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47.  The rule of law is fundamental to preventing the perpetration of crimes relating to 
the responsibility to protect. The United Nations system, including through the 
engagement of donor countries, should increase the rule of law assistance it offers to 
Member States. 
The Secretary-General expressly acknowledged the role of UNHCR in these programmes 
but, equally clearly, no single UN body could fulfil the requirements of R2P, thus 
obligations owed to individuals demand UN interoperability.169 R2P is but one example of a 
set of international obligations that are binding on States and on international organizations 
working in these contexts, but it is an extreme example – UNHCR’s mandate to provide 
international protection to refugees is clearly of a different order. However, rule of law 
protects human rights and demands of States and international organizations that remedies 
are available to victims of violations. 
On the other hand, though, on many occasions where the UN fails to perform to the 
highest possible standards, it is due to the failure by States, its members, to provide funds, 
especially voluntary contributions, and other resources. This raises questions about the 
responsibility of the UN for any internationally wrongful act arising from this shortfall, and 
about whether the Member States are fulfilling their rule of law responsibilities by leaving 
																																																								
within societies that would make them less likely to travel the path to crimes relating to the 
responsibility to protect’. 
169 See (n 64 para 30: ‘… Among those well placed to contribute to such good offices and 
public diplomacy efforts are regional and subregional mechanisms, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the 
Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, other 
special advisers, special representatives and envoys of the Secretary-General, and ranking 
officials of the United Nations, its development agencies and the Bretton Woods institutions. 
When these messages are reinforced by parallel and consistent Member State diplomacy, 
they will be more persuasive. Dialogue often achieves more than grandstanding, in part 
because it can provide parties with greater insight into each other’s motivations and 
intentions’. 
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the UN ill-equipped.170 As Klabbers makes clear,171 the relationship of complex international 
organizations, such as the UN, with its Member States does not lend itself readily to the 
attribution of responsibility. 
4.2  International organizations and the operationalization of accountability 
If the preceding subsection establishes the responsibility of the UN under rule of law criteria 
to individuals, can the UN be held accountable? There is a good deal of discussion regarding 
rule of law that focuses on how courts balance power between elites and citizens,172 but there 
is little on how the UN and individuals within its protection achieve such a balance. The UN 
has immunity from action in the domestic courts of the States where it operates, in much the 
same way as another State would have.173 The lack of a viable mechanism for establishing 
the accountability of the UN undermines rule of law,174 although the criticism may not 
always be wholly deserved. The UN operates through its Member States and the resources 
put at its disposal - sometimes those resources, such as troops for a peacekeeping operation, 
																																																								
170 Note: on the applicability of the principle of legality to economic questions, see Fuller (n 
28 170ff, esp 172–73. Therefore, if the rights of individuals are to be protected, including 
economic, social and cultural rights, the UN has to adopt a substantive/thick approach to rule 
of law because the principle of legality is inadequate in this regard. 
171 See (n 92. See also White (n 73 219ff. 
172 See eg Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 26–28, and Law’s Empire 208ff, both (n 29; 
Goldston (n 63 18–19; Harold H Koh, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’ (1997) 
106 Yale Law Journal 2599, 2622; Report of the Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights 
Council A/HRC/27/56 (27 August 2014) para 64; and David Tolbert and Andrew Solomon, 
‘United Nations Reform and Supporting the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies’ (2006) 
19 Harvard Human Rights Journal 29, 46. 
173 See UN Charter, art 105; the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations, 1 UNTS 15 (1946); as well as all the bilateral treaties with States where the UN has 
offices. See also Klabbers (n 92 27, and (n 146 149; Michael Wood, ‘Do International 
Organizations Enjoy Immunity Under Customary International Law’ in Niels Blokker and 
Nico Schrijver (eds), Immunity of International Organizations (2015) 59–60; Crawford (n 
156 74–78; and Geoff Gilbert, ‘Rights, Legitimate Expectations, Needs and Responsibilities: 
UNHCR and the New World Order’ (1998) 10 International Journal of Refugee Law 349. 
174 See Goldston (n 63 18; Klabbers (n 92 72; and Alvarez (n 12) 37–42. 
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also answer to their capital.175 That said, this does not rule out joint accountability between 
the UN and the State, such that the lack of an accountability mechanism that could apportion 
responsibility is still a major cause of concern with respect to the rule of law’s legitimacy as 
regards the UN.176 The common law understanding of rule of law as a restraint on the 
governing body,177 combined with the post-1945 Rechtsstaat as a prevailing, internalized 
principle for the organization, should best describe its implementation by the UN. 
Building on a line of case law from domestic and international courts, however, it is 
suggested that failure by the UN to provide a means by which to remedy a breach could limit 
the scope of its immunity. There is developing jurisprudence that the immunity of 
international organizations depends on the organization establishing an internal mechanism 
to respond to breaches of its obligations.178 In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v 
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (Solange 1),179 the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) held that the failure by the European Communities (EC) 
to provide a means by which to protect the human rights of German citizens, as set out in its 
constitution, meant that the German courts would continue to protect those rights vis à vis 
the EC. Solange 1 was based on the principle of proportionality, fundamental to 
substantive/thick rule of law. It was only as the EC established a human rights-based 
approach that the BVerfG acknowledged the primacy of EC legislation. In Waite and 
																																																								
175 See the discussions in Behrami and Behrami v France App no 71412/01, and Saramati v 
France, Germany and Norway App no 78166/01 (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 2 May 2007); R 
(Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58; and Al-Jedda v UK App no 
27021/08 (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 7 July 2011) esp paras 74–86. 
176 See DARIO (n 145 arts 61 and 45. And see Hovell (n 17) 45–46. 
177 Palombella (n 14) 16. 
178 See UN 1946 Convention (n 173 art VIII, Settlement of Disputes, s 29: ‘The United 
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Kennedy v Germany180 the European Court of Human Rights held that ‘a material factor in 
determining whether granting [the European Space Agency] immunity from German 
jurisdiction is permissible under the Convention is whether the applicants had available to 
them reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their rights under the Convention’. 
The right of access to a court or other adjudication mechanism for a remedy, however, is not 
absolute and respecting the immunity of an international organization may limit an 
individual’s rights if it is proportionate.181 However, if the failure to provide a remedy relates 
to fundamental rights or a more egregious breach, then there will need to be greater 
justification for denying a route to a remedy. 
The series of cases brought by the Mothers of Srebrenica in the Dutch courts against 
the UN and the Dutch government, as a consequence of Dutch troops in the enclave not 
providing the protection expected of them, is instructive in this regard. Six thousand 
Bosnians, including the Mothers of Srebrenica, began a case against The Netherlands and the 
UN for failing to prevent the deaths of thousands at Srebrenica. The UN claimed immunity 
and refused to take part in the case, and the Dutch government supported them on the ground 
that if immunity was lost it would constrain how the UN operates in peacekeeping situations. 
The Dutch District Court in The Hague found the UN had immunity under its Charter, but 
held the applicants could sue The Netherlands.182 
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Nevertheless, if rule of law applies to the UN in its operations as much as it does to 
States, then mechanisms need to exist to assess its compliance.183 One might argue that the 
UN, by analogy with the law relating to rescuers, ought to receive a wider discretion, but it 
cannot be absolute.184 In one important respect for this article, such a mechanism is already 
in place: where UNHCR carries out refugee status determination on behalf of a State, then 
the applicant can appeal a refusal. A more wide-ranging example can be seen with respect to 
the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), where the UN was effectively governing a territory. 
Paragraph 11(j) of Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 had established that 
UNMIK would protect and promote human rights. UNMIK Regulation No 1999/1185 
provided, in section 2, that ‘[i]n exercising their functions, all persons undertaking public 
duties or holding public office in Kosovo shall observe internationally recognized human 
rights standards and shall not discriminate against any person’. Regulation No 1999/24186 
provided, in section 1.3, that UNMIK authorities should observe international human rights 
law, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.187 In addition, the 
Council of Europe and UNMIK negotiated that the latter would comply with the Framework 
Convention for Protection of National Minorities.188 In relation to the commitments under 
the ICCPR and the FCNM, UNMIK filed periodic reports to the relevant treaty body as to its 
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performance vis à vis those obligations.189 That a UN body should file a report to a UN 
treaty body indicates how rule of law might be expected to work; that UNMIK filed a series 
of reports under a treaty promulgated by the Council of Europe has gone largely unnoticed in 
discussions on monitoring rule of law and speaks of how accountability can be achieved.190 
That said, UNMIK along with the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor were 
peculiarly able to accept such responsibilities, while other UN operations are not so 
formalized, although that does not mean special arrangements could not be established, 
especially in relation to Universal Periodic Review and UN Special Procedures.191 Internal 
oversight mechanisms, such as those within UNMIK, first the Ombudsperson Institution 
and, after 2006, the Human Rights Advisory Panel,192 are a further example of a flexible 
means for establishing ad hoc oversight over UN operations. In international law generally, 
non-judicial remedies ‘are the norm, not the exception’,193 so accountability for the UN can 
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be through a range of mechanisms and procedures, of the type set out in article 33 of the 
Charter. Nevertheless, a shadow still hanging over the internal operationalization of rule of 
law in the UN is the example of the cholera outbreak in Haiti: after many years, the UN 
acknowledged its responsibility in 2016 but still asserted its immunity, without establishing 
an internal mechanism to provide a remedy to victims.194 Thus, the obligation set out in the 
2012 General Assembly Resolution for the UN to observe the rule of law and for that to be 
monitored to ensure compliance could, with the necessary political will, be effected. 
Moreover, monitoring emphasizes the need for UN organs to co-operate in order to fulfil all 
the rights and meet all the needs of individuals of concern, as discussed above.195 
5.  CONCLUSION 
This article has shown how rule of law is understood in the UN. Previous work has focused 
on assessing past operations or on content alone: here, the focus has been on 
operationalization and, also, the interoperability of the different parts of the UN, which have 
all adopted their own stance in terms of the Secretary-General’s 2004 report. Having set out 
the scope of rule of law that the UN embraces, the article then discussed the different 
elements in some detail, as they have been applied and might be applied to populations 
affected by displacement because of the complexity of that particular crucible. Finally, and 
significantly, it showed how the UN has to adopt rule of law standards in its dealings with 
individuals within the scope of its actions, and how that might also facilitate interoperability 
within the UN. 
In sum, rule of law, as has been demonstrated, has many meanings and more than one 
interpretation: constitutionalized, post-1945 Rechtsstaat in many ways better encapsulates 
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the idea of rule of law within the UN system.196 The UN was not founded on a full 
application of rule of law as it is understood at the domestic level, but there are signs of 
greater application. Its theoretical underpinnings are equally multifarious. Within the UN, 
the importance of rule of law is that it provides a helpful and flexible framework for building 
the capacity of States and for protecting all individuals so that they might enjoy the full 
panoply of their rights and their needs might be met, including all those found within the 
State after displacement. It renders any distinction between humanitarian and development 
activities otiose, as the focus is on promoting justice solutions over time for individuals. As 
such, rule of law provides a framework for interoperability within the UN that is essential if 
all those rights and needs are to be fulfilled and satisfied by the State and by the UN.197 
However, with that usefulness of the approach must come the obligation for the UN to 
accept accountability to individuals of concern. 
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